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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
In the 1970’s, discussions began regarding the settlement of outstanding land claims from First 
Nations, the settling of Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE).  The Office of the Treaty Commissioner 
(OTC) was developed to facilitate intergovernmental agreements with First Nations bands. This 
endeavour created discussions that led to the signing of the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework 
Agreement (TLEFA) in 1992.    Lands purchased through TLE can be leased, creating revenues 
for the First Nations band.  Those revenues can then be used to facilitate economic development 
and wealth creation for the band.  It is through this access to capital that First Nations are starting 
to break their financial dependency on the Crown.  It has been almost two decades since the 
signing of the TLEFA, and one can begin to measure the economic impact TLE has had for First 
Nations communities.  Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) is one such band that has been 
deemed successful, both by themselves and by outsiders, in the area of economic development.  
Success depends on a community developing an economic model that incorporates Aboriginal 
cultural values.  By doing so, a cultural-oriented confidence is created, and this confidence can 
help foster economic success.  The framework for this study is based around the Harvard Project 
on Indian Economic Development and its basis for economic success being founded on a 
community having confidence in their business model as it fits with their worldview.  The 
methods employed in this study include a survey of primary and secondary documents in the area 
of TLE/TLEFA, and in economic development related to First Nations bands.  Interviews were 
conducted with those involved in the signing and the overseeing of the TLEFA.  Archival 
materials have been made available courtesy of Roy Romanow during his time as Attorney 
General for Saskatchewan.  The research demonstrates that First Nations bands can break their 
financial dependency with the Crown through economic development strategies that are 
congruent with the First Nations cultural values.   
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Chapter 1  
USING TREATY LAND ENTITLEMENT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
BREAKING DEPENDENCY 
1.1 Introduction 
The dismal economic circumstance for First Nations people in Saskatchewan is not unlike 
the dire economic situation for Indigenous peoples worldwide.  It is very difficult for First 
Nations to develop economically without productive and transferable assets such as land.  In 
many parts of Canada, First Nations are owed land from unfulfilled treaty promises, land that can 
be used for economic development.  When a band believes they have an outstanding claim, they 
can put forward a land claim – a Specific land claim.  A Comprehensive land claim is pursued 
when there is no prior arrangement for land or Aboriginal title.  The form of land claim that is 
sought is dependent on the land treaty situation from which they originate.1  In Saskatchewan, a 
Specific Claims process of Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) was developed to rectify the land 
settlement issues.2  Through the settlement of the TLE in Saskatchewan, First Nations are 
acquiring land for economic development and developing urban reserves.  Many Canadians are 
unaware of how urban reserves came into being and without sound knowledge of why they are 
occurring, people have little or a cavalier interest in the topic.  First Nations bands are settling 
land agreements that have been ignored and dishonoured for many years, and it is through 
settling these agreements that opportunities for economic development are being created.   
There have been many benefits for First Nations communities as a result of the TLE 
settlements, and some of these include social improvements, economic development, and the 
strengthening of governance structures.3  Benefits derived from the TLE process are not mutually 
exclusive; the achievements from the process have found to instil renewed confidence in First 
Nations communities, by both community members and non-community members.  The benefits 
are demonstrated by the band’s websites, and the observations made in the interview process for 
this research.  A non-community member in this research refers to someone who does not have 
                                                
1  Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Land Claims, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/index-eng.asp, 
November 2008 (accessed July 4, 2010). 
2  Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Comprehensive Claims, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/ldc/ccl/index-
eng.asp, November 2008 (accessed April 3, 2010). 
3  Joseph Garcea, Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan, University of Regina and Canadian Plains Research Center, 
http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/urban_reserves.html, 2006 (accessed April 3, 2010). 
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band membership with the First Nations band being discussed.  This research will demonstrate 
how First Nations communities are using their land settlements to foster economic development 
and what economic elements contribute to the success that the bands are experiencing.  Bands 
such as Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) are able to work towards breaking dependency from 
the Crown by developing well-suited business plans in accordance with the needs of the band and 
this progress is possible because of the funds from TLE settlements.  MLCN has been successful 
in their business endeavours because they reflect four economic strategies Harvard Project on 
Indian Economic Development, as will be demonstrated in the findings in chapter three.  
To select a band for this case study of the Saskatchewan TLE process, there were a 
number of important aspects or criterion to consider; that the band has been working on 
economic development for an extended period of time; that the economic development was the 
result of a land claims settlement; that the band is a Treaty Land Entitlement Framework 
Agreement (TLEFA) signatory; and that their claim was widely discussed so that a variety of 
sources could be accessed.  Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) was selected as the case study for 
this research because the band met the above criterion and offered the following characteristics: 
a)  It was one of the first bands to receive a TLE settlement in Saskatchewan; and  
b)  It is moving forward with economic development as a result of a TLE settlement.   
  The questions that have guided the research are:  
a) How has MLCN utilized the land from the TLE process for economic 
development?  
b) How has this progress facilitated Aboriginal self-determination and Aboriginal 
self-governance? 
A consideration that has guided this research was that success would depend on a First Nations 
community choosing or developing a business strategy based on their own cultural values and 
aspirations.  This matching of a business strategy that coincides with a First Nations worldview is 
described as “cultural match” in much of the literature, as will be discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three.  With a cultural match, a First Nations band develops confidence in its ability to design 
and implement economic strategy.  This confidence can help foster economic success.  The 
framework for this research is based upon the Harvard Project on Indian Economic Development, 
and its economic strategies and ingredients for success.4  The Harvard Project is a comprehensive 
                                                
4  The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
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study on Indigenous economic development in the United States of America (U.S.A.) and 
Nations-Building.  The foundation for success is explained in the Harvard Project as being 
grounded in a community that has confidence in their business strategy as it fits with their 
worldview.5  Put simply, the economic framework is constructed upon a foundation of Aboriginal 
values and worldview.  It can be established that MLCN is successful in the economic 
development spurred by TLE as they blend economic strategies recognized by the Harvard 
Project, and they incorporate the band’s values and worldview. 
1.2 Historical Perspective 
At the end of the 19th Century and in the early parts of the 20th Century, the federal 
government needed access to lands to further push the western frontier of Canada.  For the 
federal government to settle western Canada, treaties had to be made with the Nations that held 
the title to the land.6   Six Numbered Treaties were made with First Nations in Saskatchewan, and 
in the process reserves were created.7   When examining the history of particular reserve 
communities, it becomes evident that many First Nations have long standing grievances about 
land from the reserve creation process.  In 1992, Saskatchewan became the first province to 
establish its own provincial land entitlement framework, and this framework was accomplished 
according to Canada’s Specific Claims process to deal with outstanding lands owed.  Now other 
jurisdictions and bands can learn from the Saskatchewan framework, particularly those who are 
in the process of developing their own framework. 
Until the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (TLEFA) in 1992, the First 
Nations only retained one percent of all land that was covered by Treaty in Saskatchewan.8 
According to Peggy Martin-McGuire, an academic in the field of TLE and once special advisor 
to the Office of the Treaty Commissioner (OTC), “when all new land is acquired and converted 
                                                
Harvard University, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/ (accessed May, 9, 2009).  
5  Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian 
Economic Development, edited by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1993): 
48-51. 
6  BC Treaty Commission, Why Treaties – a legal perspective, 
www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/why_treaties.pdf (accessed April 10, 2010): 3. Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and 
Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2000): 34.  
7  Canadiana.org, “Specific Events and Topics: Numbered Treaty Overview,” in Canada in the Making, 2005, 
http://www.canadiana.org/citm/specifique/numtreatyoverview_e.html (accessed April 9, 2010).  Ray, Miller, and 
Tough. 
8  Peggy Martin-McGuire, “The Importance of the Land: Treaty Entitlement and Self-Government in 
Saskatchewan,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Inc., 1999): 274. 
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to Reserve status under the TLEFA, the figure will only be two percent.”9   Reserve land that was 
promised in the Treaties was surveyed and based on the First Nations band’s population.  “With 
the exception of Treaty 5, the allotment was one square mile per family of five, or a portion there 
of.”10  This calculation works out as follows: in Treaty 5 the allotment is 32 acres per band 
member, but in all other Saskatchewan treaties the allotment is 128 acres per band member.11  
The negotiations for settlement of TLE in Saskatchewan are based upon these calculations, which 
makes these calculations the basis of TLEFA.   
For the federal government to be able to handle land claims, the Office of Native Claims 
(ONC) was created in 1974, and their responsibility was “to determine the validity of an 
increasing number of claims being researched and submitted to the Federal Government.”12  The 
process began shortly after the Calder decision of 1973, a legal case that acknowledged the 
existence of Aboriginal title to land.  There was a split decision in court that led to a federal 
willingness to negotiate and settle First Nations Land Claims.13  This legal decision about land 
rights resulted in fifteen claims being validated in Saskatchewan by 1980.14  Originally, First 
Nations bands had been restricted to selecting Crown lands for settlement.15 This did not leave a 
lot of options for bands pursing claims.  Although the federal government was resistant to a 
purchase policy, Saskatchewan saw it as necessary.  “The provincial government was reluctant to 
shoulder the costs of a purchase policy” without the federal government’s help.16  The debate and 
the level of tension between the two levels of government were constant from the beginning of 
the Treaty Land Entitlement process because neither side wanted to shoulder too much of the 
costs involved in settlement.  Although the federal government wanted to expedite the settlement 
process, they were resistant to compromise on matters.  Ironically, this resistance made the 
                                                
9  Martin-McGuire, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, 274.  
10  Martin-McGuire, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, 275. 
11  Martin-McGuire, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, 275. 
12  David C. Knoll, “Unfinished Business: Treaty Land Entitlement and Surrender Claims in Saskatchewan,” in 
Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Journal 3, issue 2 (1987): 27. 
13  Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; David A. Cruickshank, “Calder Case,” 
in The Canadian Encyclopedia, Institute Historica Dominion Institute, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0001169 (accessed June 30, 
2010; David W. Elliot, Canadian Legal Studies Series – Law and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 5th edition 
(Concord, ON: Captus Press, 2005): 44-46.  
14  Knoll, 28. 
15  Peggy Martin-McGuire, “Treaty land Entitlement in Saskatchewan: A Context for the Creation of Urban 
Reserves,” in Urban Indian Reserves: Forging New Relationships in Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing 
Inc., 1999): 62. 
16  Martin-McGuire, Urban Indian Reserves, 67. 
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federal government spend more money than they might have been legally bound to disperse in 
the first place.17  Unfortunately, by only using Crown land, most of the land that the First Nations 
bands would be able to choose from to satisfy their claims would not be economically viable.  
With the Office of Native Claims (ONC) created, there was room for land claims to be settled in 
the Canadian political framework and for the regulatory framework to develop for the settlement 
of outstanding land entitlements such as the TLEFA. 
 A land entitlement agreement was reached in Saskatchewan in 1992, and the Treaty Land 
Entitlement Framework Agreement (TLEFA) addressed past issues that had been fought over for 
decades by the parties at the table.  The Agreement ratified a new land formula that appeared to 
be the solution all parties were looking for. The first portion of the new land entitlement process 
involved shortfall acres.  The shortfall acres are the acres that are owed from the time of reserve 
creation.  Any shortfall acres owed were to be purchased using the formula of population at the 
time of original survey of the reserve, or the Date of First Survey (DOFS).  The equation for the 
shortfall acres was “the total number of acres a Band was entitled to at the DOFS, [then] 
calculated by multiplying the DOFS population by the number of acres allocated to each Band 
member, according to the appropriate treaty.”18  The second portion of the new land entitlement 
process was to compensate First Nations with new lands based on band populations “after 1955 
and up to March 31, 1991.”19  This portion of the land entitlement process was to compensate 
First Nations for the equity that had been earned over the years in lands owed that could not be 
used by the First Nations.  “Equity Acres were…to compensate Bands for the lost use of 
occupancy of lands they were entitled to since the DOFS.”20  This new compensation idea was 
not in any of the previous formulae explored by governments. This new formula for land 
selection allows First Nations bands to select lands that are best suited to their needs and 
economic plans.   
 1.3 Rational, Purpose of Study and Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the elements present in Muskeg Lake Cree 
Nation’s (MLCN) economic development strategy to understand what characteristics made this 
                                                
17  Martin-McGuire, Urban Indian Reserves, 67. 
18  Brenda V. McLeod, “Appendix V: Treaty Land Entitlement in Saskatchewan,” in Treaty Land Entitlement 
in Saskatchewan: Conflicts in Land Use and Occupancy in the Occupancy Lake Area, Thesis, Master of Arts, Native 
Studies (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 2001): 207. 
19  McLeod, 207. 
20  McLeod, 208. 
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strategy successful. Both MLCN’s definition of success and the non-band member’s definition 
will be assessed.  A non-band member is someone who is not a member of the band that is being 
discussed.  The major research questions concerning this research are:  
a) How are bands using TLE to foster economic development? 
b) What makes MLCN a success in the area of economic development? 
c) What are some of the problems with the agreement or settlement process that need 
to be addressed?   
 1.4 Importance of Inquiry 
Examining MLCN is meant to serve both First Nations and non-First Nations 
governments, as success in this area can lead to bands breaking dependency from the Crown and 
advancing to higher levels of self-determination and self-governance.  It is determined that 
MLCN has been successful in Saskatchewan in economic development terms because the band 
uses a blend of four economic strategies outlined in the Harvard Project, and they incorporated 
their community’s worldview and values as discussed in Chapter Three.  There have been many 
positive outcomes for First Nations communities who have been able to settle land claims under 
the TLEFA.  The interest that underlines this research area is to explore the how and why 
business ventures were being developed from their settlement claims and how they have been 
portrayed in the media, such as television news and newspapers. 
1.5 Issues Surrounding TLE 
Problems associated with TLE become observable once the process is put into practice.  
The most evident problems revealed themselves in the interview process for this research.  The 
problems identified by the politicians included; the lack of plan for implementation in the 
beginning; breakdowns in communication; and bureaucratic delays – these are all problems that 
relate to time.  It is not that the process is too quick, but rather it is too slow.  The slowness of the 
TLE settlements delays economic development for First Nations, which then lengthens the time 
that the band is dependent on the Crown.  When a band breaks dependency from the Crown, they 
are more capable of making decisions for the betterment of their community.  Now that some of 
the problems with the TLE settlement process and economic development are known, they are 
issues that can better be addressed. 
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1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Materials Used 
 The methods employed in this study include a survey of primary and secondary 
documents in the area of TLE and the TLEFA with respect to First Nations and Economic 
Development.  Included in the materials of this research are the Harvard Project, TLE and the 
TLEFA materials, as well as articles relating to urban reserves. Interviews were held with key 
political players who were involved in the signing and, in some ways, the overseeing of the 
development of the TLEFA.  Interviews were conducted with: Roy Romanow, former Premier of 
Saskatchewan and former Attorney General; Bill McKnight, former Minister of Indian Affairs, 
government of Canada; Harry Lafond, former Chief of Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN); and 
Roland Crowe, the former chief of Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN).  The 
interviews conducted cannot be collaborated with documentation at this time, as the 
Saskatchewan Archives have not yet catalogued Mr. Romanow’s paper from his time as Premier 
of the province, which makes reviewing all the correspondence impossible at this time.  It is for 
this reason that the presentation of the materials from the interviews is given in the context of 
reflections.  Mr. Romanow facilitated access to archival materials corresponding to his time as 
Attorney General for Saskatchewan.  These papers include correspondences between the people 
involved in the process, offering insight to some of the complications in the early years of 
development of the TLEFA.  As Mr. Romanow’s papers for his time as Premier of Saskatchewan 
are not yet available, there is a gap in the research. Further research should be undertaken when 
these materials are made accessible. 
1.6.2 Process of Research   
The research began with surveying the secondary documents.  After reviewing these 
materials, MLCN was examined.  For the MLCN case study, the band’s website and materials 
were used to get a survey of the community and to observe development from their point of view.  
These materials helped to understand the bands measure of success in their economic 
development.  The last area of examination was through the interview process.  The interviews 
were valuable as they were reflections from the people who were involved in the TLEFA process.  
Issues could be identified that were unknown until the Agreement was put into practice.  Once 
the research was concluded, the economic development strategies were explored and discussed in 
relation to other academic strategies.  Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) is discussed and 
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analyzed in the context of Harvard Project’s economic strategies findings.  It was through this 
examination that it was determined what characteristics make MLCN economically successful.  
The interviews were developed in tandem with the archival materials, and contextualized with the 
developments that took place.  As these areas of research were developed, the findings and 
conclusions were worked through and organized for analysis. 
1.7 Chapter Organization 
The chapters for this research are organized as building blocks for understanding TLE and 
how it is being used to create economic development opportunities for First Nations in 
Saskatchewan.  This organization explains how the development is helping bands break 
economic dependency with the Crown.  Chapter One serves as the foundation of knowledge in 
the area of TLE and the TLEFA.  It is through the TLE settlements that this research is based.  
This chapter is also an examination of the materials available in the area being explored.  Land 
Claims is a process that first began in the 1970s, and it was in the 1990s that Saskatchewan saw 
its own process come to fruition with the TLEFA.  The chapters that follow develop the 
groundwork for economic development strategies that are involved in First Nations economic 
development, how MLCN utilizes development strategies and key ingredients for success, and is 
followed by an examination of the TLE process now that it has been functioning for almost 
twenty years.  The research then closes with a discussion of findings as a result of the 
investigation conducted.   
The Harvard Project on Indian Economic Development is outlined in the second chapter, 
as well as other aspects of economic development and considerations that need to be taken into 
account when planning economic development for First Nations bands.21  This chapter involves 
input from other academics working in the area of economic development for First Nations 
bands, particularly those in Saskatchewan.  The Harvard Project largely focuses on the American 
situation, but the development strategies proposed are relevant to the economic development 
occurring with First Nations in Canada.  Academics that work in the Canadian Indigenous field 
such as Robert Alexander Innes and Terrence Pelletier often apply the Nation-Building model 
from the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development when looking at Canadian 
matters.22  Other academics that look to the use of this project in Canada include Brian Calliou 
                                                
21  The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/ (accessed May, 9, 2009).  Cornell and Kalt. 
22  Robert Alexander Innes and Terrence Ross Pelletier, “Cowessess First Nation: Self-Government, Nation-
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and Collette D. Manuel.23 In outlining economic strategies, the academics bring awareness to 
elements that should be present in First Nations economic development so that the development 
that occurs has the highest probability of being successful and self-sustaining.   
Chapter three presents the findings of the MLCN case study.  The findings show that 
MLCN uses a blended economic development strategy by incorporating notions of economic 
development that match the community’s worldview and fits with the Harvard Project model.  
The First Nations is used as the case model for First Nations success in economic development 
because they are viewed as successful according to their own measure, by measure of academics 
and government officials, and by the measure of time.24  By facilitating strong economic 
development, MLCN has been able to bring its band into a position that allows for decision-
making and self-determination through access to funds.  By exercising more control they are 
breaking their economic dependency with the Crown.   
To develop an economic perspective, the fourth chapter asked Roland Crowe, Roy 
Romanow, Bill McKnight and Harry Lafond to reflect on how TLE has shaped economic 
development for First Nations in Saskatchewan.  Is it what they expected?  What would they 
change given the opportunity?  The answers to these questions highlight what is positive about 
the TLEFA process and what has been some of the drawbacks that need to be brought forward 
and discussed.  The positive that was discussed was that people are becoming more accepting of 
First Nations economic development, bands are being welcomed by non-First Nations 
communities, and the business world has made accommodations to facilitate First Nations 
economic development by adapting some business loan practices (as will be discussed later by 
Chief Harry Lafond and Chief Roland Crowe).  The flaws observed were: the lack of a 
contingency plan for implementation; the breakdowns in communication; and the administrative 
or bureaucratic delays.  These are flaws that have become evident now that the process has been 
implemented for several years.  The problems that were identified were unavoidable as the 
process was itself a learning experience.  By looking at the strengths and weaknesses, parties 
                                                
Building and Treaty Land Entitlement,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 3rd 
edition, ed. Yale Belanger (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Inc., 2008): 241-243.   
23  Brian Calliou, “The Significance of Building Leadership and Community Capacity to Implement Self-
Government,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada:  Current Trends and Issues, 3rd edition, edited by Yale D. 
Belanger, (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Inc., 2008): 332-347; Collette D. Manuel, Canadian First Nation 
Community Economic Development Planning: Key Factors for Success, A Master’s Degree Project Submitted to the 
Faculty of Environmental Design (Calgary, January 30, 2007). 
24  Robert Brent Anderson, Economic Development among the Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: The Hope for 
the Future (Concord, ON: Captus Press, 1999): 162. 
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negotiating in the future are able to learn from previous experiences and can implement good 
points, and develop solutions where there is weakness.   
In the final chapter, conclusions are offered with respect to the research that was 
conducted.  Perspective of the research is being discussed for the benefit of other jurisdictions 
and bands that plan to implement their own version of the TLEFA or settlement agreement.  
Chapter Five explores the strengths and problems the players of the TLEFA identified.  It also 
summarizes the economic strategy options and elements available to be drawn from, as well as 
demonstrates how MLCN is a success because of its’ blending of economic strategies and these 
elements.  By analyzing both the strengths and weaknesses found in the Saskatchewan model of 
TLE, other jurisdictions and bands can learn from Saskatchewan when developing settlement 
claims and economic development for their particular First Nations.   
1.8 Literature Review 
Literature examined for this research can be segmented into three broad topic areas – 
areas of economic development, policy, and history.  Often times the literature that discusses 
economic development touches on some of the other areas listed, especially self-government and 
self-sufficiency.  When looking at government negotiations, policy must be explored, as it is the 
foundation that guides government negotiations.  For example, the relationships at the negotiating 
table for the TLE are filtered through the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act.25  
Within several of the materials explored, an historical context is provided; however, there are 
materials that deal specifically with the history of treaties and land rights, land claims, or the TLE 
history of Saskatchewan.  Combining these materials with archival documents and interviews, 
allows for a broader picture of the TLE settlement process in Saskatchewan and how bands can 
utilize the process to develop economically, and strengthen as a whole to become more self-
sufficient. 
In the area of economic development, a comprehensive study available is the Harvard 
Project on Indian Economic Development by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt.  The Harvard 
Project provides an analytic framework and touches on many important aspects of economic 
development – strong governance, dependency, elements and ingredients to success, economic 
strategies, and the importance of confidence and cultural match.  Some other academics that 
cover economic development and discuss some of the aspects the Harvard Project explore 
                                                
25   King George III, The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (England: October 7, 1763). 
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include: Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea, John H. Hylton, John Borrows and Sarah Morales, 
Brian Calliou, Michael Gertler, and Bradford W. Morse.26  There are also public organizations, 
non-academics such as people working in government, and lawyers that have produced materials 
in the area, Dwight Dorey (former Chief of Congress of Aboriginal Peoples – CAP), David C. 
Hawkes, attorney, James Parker, communications officer, Amy Jo Ehman, journalist, and 
Western Economic Diversification Canada to name a few.27  Very few of these materials deal 
with a single topic, many materials cross over in the areas mentioned above. 
When examining TLE and the land history in Saskatchewan within the scope of land 
claims, several academics have produced substantial work.  Some pieces were produced in 
relation to a particular band in Saskatchewan.  Academics in the area include Sarah Carter, Noel 
Dyck, Peggy Martin-McGuire, Brenda McLeod, Robert A. Innes and Terrance Pelletier, James 
Pitsula, Bill Waiser, Arthur Ray, Frank Tough and Jim Miller.28  Lawyers such as Richard 
                                                
26 Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea, “Aboriginal Self-Government and the Creation of New Indian Reserves: 
A Saskatchewan Case Study,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd edition, 
edited by John H. Hylton (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 1999): 289-309.  John H. Hylton, “The Case for Self-
Government: A Social Policy Perspective,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 
2nd edition, edited by John H. Hylton, (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 1999): 78-91; John Borrows and Sarah 
Morales, “Challenge, Change and Development in Aboriginal Economies,” in Legal Aspects of Aboriginal Business 
Development, edited by Dwight Dorey and Joseph Magnet, (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005): 137-166; 
Calliou; Michael Gertler, “Indian Urban Reserves and Community Development: Social Issues,” in Urban Indian 
Reserves: Forging New Relationships in Saskatchewan, edited by Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea, (Saskatoon, 
Purich Publishing Ltd., 1999): 263-279; Bradford W. Morse, “The Inherent Right of Aboriginal Governance,” in 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Inc.  1999): 16-44; Anderson; Wanda 
Wuttunee, Living Rhythms: Lessons in Aboriginal Economic Resilience and Vision (Toronto: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2004). 
27 Dorey, Dwight, “Development Unreserved: Aboriginal Economic Development for the Twenty-First 
Century,” in Legal Aspects of Aboriginal Business Development, edited by Dwight Dorey and Joseph Magnet, 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005): 9-27; David C. Hawkes, “Rebuilding the Relationship: The ‘Made in 
Saskatchewan’ Approach to First Nations Governance,” In Canada: The State of the Federation 2003 – 
Reconfiguring Aboriginal State Relations, ed. Michael Murphy, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, School of 
Policy studies (Kingston, Queen’s University by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005): 120-132; Amy Jo Ehman, 
“Health Policy – First Nations’ clinics: Gateway to privatization?” in Synopsis, In Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 170, no. 8 (April 13, 2004): 1215; Western Economic Diversification Canada, “Saskatoon: Creation of 
Muskeg Lake Cree Nation Urban Reserve, in Urban Reserves in Saskatchewan, Government of Canada, Western 
Economic Diversification Canada, modified December 22, 2008 http://www.wd.gc.ca/eng/10950.aps. (accessed 
January 20, 2009). 
28 Sarah Carter, “Cultural Crossroads: The Red River Settlement,” in Aboriginal People and the Colonizers of 
Western Canada to 1900, edited by Sarah Carter, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999): 62-82; Noel Dyck, 
“The Negotiation of Indian Treaties and Land Rights in Saskatchewan,” in Aboriginal Land and Land Rights, eds. 
Nicolas Peterson and Marcia Langton (Canberra Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1983); Martin-McGuire, 
Urban Indian Reserves, 53-77; McLeod; Innes and Pelletier, 240-259; James M. Pitsula, “The Blakeney Government 
and the Settlement of Treaty Indian Land Entitlements in Saskatchewan, 1975-1982,” in The Journal of the 
Canadian Historical Association: Historical Papers, Vol. 24, No. 1, (1989): 190-209; Bill Waiser, “Chapter 2: Our 
Shared Destiny?” in The Heavy Hand of History: Interpreting Saskatchewan’s Past, ed. G. P. Marchildon (Regina: 
Canadian Plains Research Center, 2005): 7-30; Ray, Miller, and Tough. 
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Bartlett, and David C. Knoll have also produced materials in discussing the history of TLE in 
Saskatchewan.29  Policy and government documents are important when exploring tripartite 
government agreements and often reflect the relationships involved between the parties.  The 
foundation of the Aboriginal policy and relationships in Canada is found in the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763.30  This document establishes the relationship framework for which all 
following policy is organized.  The federal government provides important documents such as the 
Indian Act, government agreements, and policy documents.31  Other branches and levels of 
government produce documents on policy, and they can be found with the Department of Justice, 
the OTC, the government of Saskatchewan and First Nations organizations producing materials 
that include CAP, Assembly of First Nations (AFN), and FSIN as well as local band-level 
governments.32  When researching multi-level government agreements – tripartite agreements – 
like that of the TLEFA, in most instances governments will have policy for which their position 
in the agreement is based.  Examining various points of view of agreements provides insight into 
how and why the agreement took place. 
When conducting research and reading the available materials, gaps in the research 
become evident.  The Romanow papers for his time as Premier of Saskatchewan have not yet 
been organized and catalogued by the Saskatchewan Archives Board.  When reading materials, 
gaps are also made evident when research questions go unanswered or new ones are created.  
Academics also point to gaps in their own writing, where more research needs to be conducted.  
Of the academics, authors, and government documents listed, Barron and Garcea worked the 
most closely and extensively in Saskatchewan land claims settlements and economic 
development.33  It is for this reason that the gaps they identified in the research are most pertinent 
                                                
29  Richard H. Bartlett, “Native Land Claims: Outstanding Treaty Land Entitlement in Saskatchewan, 1982-
89,” in Devine Rule in Saskatchewan: A Decade of Hope and Hardship, ed. Leslie Biggs (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing, 1990): 137-148; Knoll. 
30  King George III, The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (England: October 7, 1763). 
31  Department of Justice, “Indian Act (R.S., 1985, c. 1-5),” Servicing Canadians, Government of Canada.  
Department of Justice Canada, updated January 19, 2009, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/I-5/ (accessed January 20, 
2009). 
32  Department of Justice.  Office of the Treaty Commissioner, About Us, Office of the Treaty Commissioner, 
updated 2009, http://www.otc.ca/About_Us/ (accessed January 20, 2009); Government of Saskatchewan, 
“Saskatchewan Treaty Areas,” in First Nations and Métis Relations 
http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/community/maps/treaties (accessed February 9, 2008); Assembly of First Nations, 
“Annual Report 2006-2007,” in Resolution of Claims, 2007, http://www.afn.ca/article.asp?id=127 (accessed July 4, 
2010); Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, Lands and Resources Secretariat, 
http://www.fsin.com/index.php/lands-a-resources.html (accessed July 4, 2010). 
33  Barron and Garcea. 
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to this research. 
Garcea and Barron identified critical gaps in the existing research, as well they list the 
areas that require attention in the context of urban reserves and business opportunities; as there is 
no focus on rural property their list does not provide examples for economic development as a 
whole.  The research, according to Garcea and Barron, is lacking because it does not take into 
account bands that have chosen to invest their TLE money in rural property and business 
opportunities.34  There is research available in the area of urban reserves and in TLE and TLEFA 
because many of the urban reserves are themselves products of TLE settlements and part of 
economic development goals.  
Barron and Garcea note that the first area that needs more attention is in the area of cost-
benefit analysis for reserves.35  Cost-benefit analysis for reserves is important when looking at 
the prospects for business development or opportunity.  This is a concept that is addressed in a 
later discussion about reserve creation for economic development; it will be discussed in the 
second chapter in relation to market opportunity being a factor on whether or not a band will be 
economically successful. 
According to Barron and Garcea, the second area that needs more attention is the analysis 
of management practices.36  The study on the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) does not 
conduct an examination of internal management practices of Saskatchewan First Nations bands, 
but will identify the options for management practices.  MLCN is chosen for the case model as it 
is held up by many academics as a model of success, and because they develop successful 
enterprises, which makes them an ideal case study to explore factors leading to success.37  It is 
important to note how MLCN sees their own band as successful, and to use their definition of 
success when examining the band.  Determinants of success should not be externally imposed on 
the community; they should be able to define their own success. 
The final area that Barron and Garcea believe needs attention is with the changing 
function of the reserves and their values over time.38  Although this study does not address this 
area with the same intent the authors have, it is addressed.  This study accounts for the passage of 
                                                
34  F. Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea, “Conclusion,” in Urban Indian Reserves: Forging New Relationships 
in Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Inc., 1999): 297. 
35  Barron and Garcea, 297. 
36  Barron and Garcea, 297. 
37  Anderson, 162. 
38  Barron and Garcea, 297. 
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time, as it is prudent to see how economic development has progressed over time.  MLCN’s land 
entitlement settlement is now more than twenty years old along with the band’s economic 
development plans.  Not only have MLCN been successful, but also they have been successful 
for a number of years, which has allowed for enough time to study the long-term implications for 
their TLE settlement.   
There are academics that conduct crossover research similar to what is being examined in 
this study; however, their work does not pertain to economic development as a result of specific 
claims or how TLE is being used.  Robert B. Anderson has done extensive research when 
examining economic development and comprehensive claims in Canada, and even contrasts some 
of this with examples from Aotearoa New Zealand.  Anderson develops concepts of theory 
(dependency, modernization, and contingency) and explores the concept of Aboriginal title to 
land as determined by the Calder decision.  This author focuses greatly on the Mackenzie 
Pipeline as well as the British Columbia situation, the Northern Territories, and the Meadow 
Lake Tribal Council in Saskatchewan, none of which are developments that resulted from 
Specific Claims or TLE, but strong examples of development nonetheless.  Wanda Wuttunee is 
another academic working within the area of Indigenous economic development and self-
sufficiency; she too looks at strong economic examples, but not examples resulting from TLE 
Specific Claims.  Wuttunee explores business development in Northern Alberta and the Northern 
Territories, as her studies are examples of economic development and self-sufficiency.  This 
information does not look at these developments in the context of TLE or Specific Claims, which 
is were this study being conducted focuses and helps build the literature.  The author explores 
business that result from different business initiatives, initiatives that began as independent 
projects or done by individuals, as well as examining funding avenues that are available to people 
and bands that do not have access to funds via TLE. 
Aside from the gaps identified by the academics, gaps become exposed when reviewing 
the literature available.  There is nothing available to examine when looking at bands using TLE 
settlements for economic development in the context of organizational strategy, such as elements 
and ingredients employed.  It is acknowledged that the Harvard Project does not specifically deal 
with Saskatchewan land claims.  The Harvard model can be seen by some as inapplicable in the 
Canadian situation as it is an American model and as such, has a different historical background.  
In the United States of America, there is no Indian Act as there is in Canada, which makes the 
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foundation of operations different for American Indians than Canadian First Nations.  In Canada, 
the Canadian federal government works with First Nations according to the relationships outlined 
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act. There is also the matter of sovereignty.  It 
was established in the United States through a court case, Cherokee v. Georgia that the American 
Indians have a form of limited sovereignty, something that has not yet been determined the same 
way in Canada.39  As demonstrated in the following chapter, however, many academics apply the 
Harvard Project model and elements to the Canadian experience of First Nations economic 
development.  It is a broad model with portions that can be workable in Canada, and be 
customized to the development and land situation when a First Nations is striving for economic 
self-determination.  Elements found in the Harvard Project that work in Canadian situations, are 
found to be applicable in the Saskatchewan context of First Nations economic development. 
1.9 Conclusion 
 Although there are flaws in the TLEFA process, it is still a template in Canada from 
which other jurisdictions and bands have to work.  The interviews are used to highlight potential 
flaws in the process so other jurisdictions and bands can learn from the barriers in the current 
Saskatchewan model.  The TLEFA is a blueprint within Specific Claims for the First Nations 
governments and non-First Nations governments that need to deal with outstanding claims and 
are looking for a process to resolve the claims.  First Nations bands should explore various 
strategies and create a model that fits with the economic development they wish to accomplish 
with the settlements they receive from land entitlement claims.  It appears that MLCN is 
successful in its endeavour with their use of the four economic strategies presented by the 
Harvard Project.  MLCN succeeds because they chose a strategy for development that fit their 
community’s worldview.  Their experience suggests that it is through economic success in 
development that bands can put themselves on the path to self-determination and break the 
dependency with the Crown. 
                                                
39  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; Peter d’Errico, John Marshall: Indian Lover? 
http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/marshall_jow.html (accessed August 11, 2010) as appeared in Journal of the 
West 39, no. 3 (Summer 2000). 
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Chapter 2  
STRATEGIES AVAILABLE FOR FIRST NATIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
For many years governments imposed barriers on First Nations that prevented economic 
development.1  As Laurie Barron and Joe Garcea pointed out, “the federal government favoured 
the creation of reserves as a means of circumscribing the land holdings and mobility of Indians.”2  
As such, reserves hindered economic development for First Nations peoples because it was a land 
system that left people with no capital for investment, or even capital to borrow against.  This 
system for regulating First Nations and confining them to reserves created a First Nations 
dependency on the Crown.  Even though the federal government first used reserves as tools of 
repression and assimilation, First Nations are now using reserves as tools for empowerment as 
they are “now creating [Reserves] as a means to further their economic, social, cultural, and 
political development objectives.”3  Now that TLE settlements are creating economic 
development and reserves are a source of revenue for many First Nations, the bands are now in a 
position to start breaking free from the Crown-imposed dependency. 
This chapter explores the burden of dependency First Nations have experienced and 
continue to face, as well as other barriers, such as land control issues, natural resource 
management, government programs, and geographic location that have impeded First Nations’ 
economic development.  Programs for economic development for First Nations in Canada 
occurred in the latter part of the 20th century and were developed by the federal government.  
However, problems ensued with the process because non-First Nations peoples developing the 
programs did not understand First Nations’ worldview.  The core of the chapter is to explore the 
elements involved in successful economic development and strategies of economic development, 
                                                
1   Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC), “Leadership Creation: Economic Development and 
Removing Barriers, Self-Government and Traditional Knowledge/Governance,” prepared for the Second National 
Aboriginal Women’s Summit II (NWAC, Yellowknife, NWT, July 29-31, 2008): 7, 10, 11, 14.  Hon. Gerry St. 
Germain and Hon. Nick Sibbeston, “Part III: Indian Act Barriers to Economic Development on Reserve,” in Sharing 
Canada’s Prosperity: A Hand Up, Not A Handout – Final Report Special Study on the Involvement of Aboriginal 
Communities and Businesses in Economic Development Activities in Canada, Standing Senate Committee on 
Aboriginal Peoples, March 2007. 
2  Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea, “Aboriginal Self-Government and the Creation of New Indian Reserves: 
A Saskatchewan Case Study,” in Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd edition, 
edited by John H. Hylton (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 1999): 289.   
3  Barron and Garcea, “Aboriginal Self-Government and the Creation of New Indian Reserves: A 
Saskatchewan Case Study,” 289.  
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such as cultural match, that must be taken into account when First Nations are looking to develop 
economic self-sufficiency.   
The foundation of the chapter is the Nation Building model developed by the Harvard 
Project on Indian Economic Development led by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt.  The model 
developed within the American study is used as a comparison to the literature available in 
Canada.  Through the American project and the Canadian models and elements that are available 
for examination, various strategies for First Nations economic development are explored and 
developed further in this chapter: Federal Control, Tribal Enterprise, Private Enterprise with a 
Tribal Member owning the business, and non-Tribal members involved in Private Enterprise.  In 
considering potential strategies, certain factors that impact the economic development process 
become evident.  In order to break government dependency and advance economic development 
and self-determination through economic self-sufficiency, the First Nations require a resource 
base, a good economic business plan, and good governance.4  Furthermore, and more 
importantly, these elements must all be based on a strong cultural match that is in harmony with 
the First Nations’ community value systems as will be explored in the chapter.   
The federal government created a burden of dependency by making First Nations 
dependent on government cooperation while they were procuring land for settlement of non-First 
Nations people.  First Nations people were put on reserves, and limited by legal and social 
barriers that kept them in a submissive position under the Canadian government.5  With the 
advent of the TLE developments in Saskatchewan, the idea of reserves has since become an 
infrastructure for acquiring assets and creating economic development for First Nations.  Once 
more land and assets had been made available for First Nations settlement and economic 
development, strategies had to be chosen by bands that best suited their development needs.  Not 
only does the economic strategy have to match the band’s economic development needs, but they 
should be intertwined to match the bands’ cultural development needs as well.6  If a band can 
select a strategy that integrates elements of their own culture, a confidence in the economic 
strategy can be developed, and the business or economic development has a better chance of 
                                                
4   Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian 
Economic Development, edited by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1993). 
5  Barron and Garcea, 289.  Dorey, Dwight, “Development Unreserved: Aboriginal Economic Development 
for the Twenty-First Century,” in Legal Aspects of Aboriginal Business Development, edited by Dwight Dorey and 
Joseph Magnet, (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005): 12.   
6  Cornell and Kalt, 6.   
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success.   
2.2 Burden of Dependency 
Stephen Cornell explains that the Burden of Dependency is one of the heaviest burdens 
First Nations peoples have to experience.  The Burden of Dependency, according to Stephen 
Cornell, occurs through “the expropriation of Indigenous lands, (and) the social welfare policies,” 
among other interactions.7  Laurie Barron and Joseph Garcea have similar views to that of 
Cornell when discussing this idea of dependency.  The common thread between Cornell, and 
Barron and Garcea, is that there is a lack of human capital (lack of a trained work force), plus this 
the dependency on social welfare as a result of unemployment, and these are then added to the 
lack of employability generally in First Nations’ home communities.8 
Control over people to gain access to lands would be a motivating factor as to why 
governments created an environment of dependency.  There would have to be a motivating factor 
or incentive for creating dependency because governments will not take on unnecessary 
economic cost.  Looking at the cost-benefit, the government in all likelihood saw the access to 
land as more valuable than the costs of supporting a race that was supposed to vanish.  The 
government-created dependency undermined the political autonomy of First Nations government 
that the non-First Nations government wished to marginalize.  According to Cornell, this policy 
has left “Indigenous nations hostage to policy decisions made by other governments, serving 
interests that may depart significantly from those nations’ own concerns.”9  The Canadian 
government has used the burden of dependency as a way to supersede First Nations governments, 
take control, make way for settlement, and create the Euro/Canadian context deemed superior.  
This process also sets up the ‘other’ power imbalance theory between the Canadian government 
and the First Nations. This imbalance refers to a situation where one party becomes the dominant 
controlling party, while the other party becomes the submissive, though not unresistant, 
controlled party.10 
The Canadian government was able to secure much of the Indigenous land for their own 
                                                
7  Stephen Cornell, “What Makes First Nations Enterprises Successful? Lessons From the Harvard Project,” 
in Legal Aspects of Aboriginal Business Development, eds. Dwight Dorey and Joseph Magnet (Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005): 52.   
8  Cornell, 52.  Barron and Garcea, “The Genesis of Urban Reserves and the Role of Government Self-
Interest,” 24.    
9  Cornell, 53.   
10  Sarah Carter, “Cultural Crossroads: The Red River Settlement,” in Aboriginal People and the Colonizers of 
Western Canada to 1900, edited by Sarah Carter, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999): 78-79. 
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settlement in exclusion to the First Nations, which is common to the colonial experience.11  As 
previously mentioned, the government created and used reserves as tools to implement policies 
so that settlers could make use of non-reserve land and so that First Nations could be kept away 
from settlers.  Reserves “evolved as islands of underdevelopment, sometimes in the midst of rich 
regional economies.”12  Barron and Garcea explain that First Nations have one of the smallest per 
capita land bases in the world.13  Dwight Dorey, former National Chief of the Congress of 
Aboriginal Peoples (CAP), asserts, “Reserves were not created for the collective economic 
benefit or development of First Nations as Nations,” but that the reserves were nothing but “a 
crude form of assisted termination.”14  The federal government attempted to assimilate First 
Nations through the reserve system, which left the First Nations very economically weak.15  With 
little or no opportunity left for the First Nations peoples, the government was able to exercise 
strict political policies and create a dependency on the federal government in order to further 
carry out assimilation and forcing First Nations to exist under the colonial customs.  These types 
of control allowed the colonizer to access and control the resource bases of the First Nations 
people. 
2.3 Barriers for First Nations Economic Development 
The barriers to First Nations development take various forms, and happen in two avenues 
– through communities as a whole, and through the individual.  Until the 1980s, the development 
policy for First Nations in Canada had two premises, “one – reserve-based community 
development, and two – integration or assimilation of Aboriginal people as individuals into the 
wider economy.”16  These contradictory methods demonstrate how the government was 
interested in trying different methods until they were satisfied with the outcome.  The economic 
opportunities on reserves were often government jobs with a limited number of positions 
available.  There was not enough work to provide employment for an entire community and this 
lack of employment created a dependency.  Trans-generational welfare dependency can develop 
into a lack of opportunity for employment, especially for those who live in reserve communities 
                                                
11  Susan C. Mapp, “International Social Development,” in Human Rights and Social Justice in a Global 
Perspective: an Introduction to International Social Work, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008): 13.  
12  Barron and Garcea, “The Genesis of Urban Reserves and the Role of Government Self-Interest,” 24.   
13  Barron and Garcea, “The Genesis of Urban Reserves and the Role of Government Self-Interest,” 24.   
14  Dorey, 12.   
15  John L. Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada’s Indian Policy,” in 
As Long as the Sun Shines and the Water Flows, eds. Getty and Lussier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1983): 41. 
16  Dorey, 12/13.  St. Germain and Sibbeston. 
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that are remote.  People cannot become economically self-sufficient when government policies 
are placed upon them that limit opportunity. 
Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt detail the ‘obstacles to development’, that First Nations 
communities face in economic development as of a list that includes many of the factors 
observed by a number of scholars.  John Borrows and Sarah Morales explain a similar concept 
and outlook of First Nations economic impediment as “Barriers to Aboriginal Economic 
Success”.  Both Cornell and Kalt’s views, as well as Borrows and Morales' views about First 
Nations economic development acknowledge the lack of resources in First Nations communities, 
with land being the primary resource that First Nations are lacking.   
In Cornell and Kalt’s evaluation, this lack of land control is directly connected to a 
general lack of resources.  Cornell and Kalt observe that American “Reservations are poor in 
natural resources,” and for those reservations that are not, they have a “lack of sufficient control 
over them.”17  If there is no control over land or resources, how can a First Nations band take the 
initiative to overcome development constraints or barriers?  Borrows and Morales also include 
resources in the land discussion, and explain that the Canadian federal government “allocated 
reserve resources and economic opportunities to others, and itself participated in confiscating the 
most valuable reserve resources – sometimes illegally.”18  Without access to or control over 
resources, there is no revenue that bands can generate economic wealth from. 
According to Borrows and Morales, natural resources are the cornerstone of First Nations 
communities regardless of the type of economy sought, whether it is for subsistence, wage 
provision, or profit seeking.19  First Nations need to have control over land and natural resources 
to develop their economy.  Borrows and Morales argue “communities will have difficulty 
creating healthy economies for their citizens,” unless they have sufficient control over said 
resources.20  The ability of First Nations to control their land and resources and assert decision-
making power will facilitate self-determination while decreasing government dependency and 
control.  Borrows and Morales explain the impact and significance of the problems with reserves.  
Reserves are seen as small islands of land, often with little resources for the First Nations 
                                                
17  Cornell and Kalt, 6.   
18  John Borrows and Sarah Morales, “Challenge, Change and Development in Aboriginal Economies,” in 
Legal Aspects of Aboriginal Business Development, edited by Dwight Dorey and Joseph Magnet, (Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2005): 143.   
19  Borrows and Morales, 146.   
20  Borrows and Morales, 146.   
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peoples, leaving the band economically weak and adding to the dependency problem, making it 
difficult for communities to meet their basic needs.21  With a small land base and no control of 
resources, it is almost impossible to develop any type of economic action plan.  This forces First 
Nations to maintain dependency upon the federal government.  
Cornell and Kalt explain that the problem with the American reservation system is either 
that there is lack of effective planning or that the reservations are often the “subject to too much 
planning and not enough action.”22  This is a result of government agencies being over-involved 
in policy development, and interfering in the daily activities of the First Nations people through 
policy and legislation while not following up on the plans and actions put in place.  Dwight 
Dorey acknowledges this aspect of reserve life in the types of programming First Nations have 
seen in Canada.  Programs include training programs, community development programs and 
other policy directed initiatives.  John Hylton adds to this discussion with his analysis of social 
programs that have been imposed upon First Nations by the Canadian government.  John Hylton 
concludes that programs imposed on First Nations have failed because non-First Nations peoples 
who do not understand the people they are planning for are designing the programs.  Hylton also 
points out that programs designed and implemented by First Nations have for the most part been 
successful and no more costly than programs run by non-First Nations peoples or governments.23  
Programs provided by governments often limit a person or a band’s potential by forcing them to 
operate within government placed boundaries.  When First Nations peoples or First Nations 
governments design programs, there is a better chance that the program will have more of a 
cultural fit than programs designed solely by government officials, as First Nations people 
creating programs better understand the needs of the people.24   
An additional hindrance for First Nations communities that contributes to the problems of 
economic development and dependency is the lack of investment capital available for both 
financial and natural resources.  According to Borrows and Morales, the “most direct barrier to 
Aboriginal economic success is the lack of access to natural or physical capital,” be it tangible 
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assets or a labour force.25  Cornell and Kalt make a similar observation about there being a lack 
of access to financial capital for First Nations bands and individuals.  They explain that this is 
because many bands are not able to persuade investors to come to reserves, as they are receiving 
“intense competition from non-Indian communities.”26  It is hard to compete against non-First 
Nations communities when distance from markets can be a factor, but this is something that is 
changing with the creation of urban reserves.  As urban reserves emerge, investment capital will 
become more readily available, which will reduce one of the major developmental barriers First 
Nations bands face. 
Borrows and Morales assert that financial institutions are hesitant to invest in small First 
Nations communities, as the location and size are often perceived as high-risk ventures, which is 
why many institutions refuse to get involved.27  Harry Lafond later explains in Chapter Four that 
financial policies needed to change because of the risk involved with First Nations business.  
These reasons of apprehensions are exacerbated by the fact that many First Nations applicants 
have little experience, training, and/or have a minimal business record.28  Borrows and Morales 
acknowledge that there is a lack of capital in First Nations communities and that this is a problem 
that is particularly prevalent for small business.29  What makes this different from Cornell and 
Kalt’s view is that instead of focusing on market competition from the outside, Borrows and 
Morales look to the high unemployment in First Nations communities and the low incomes that 
leave very “little opportunity for individuals to accumulate savings that might be used for 
investment.”30  This relates to the idea of land and property because without control of natural 
resources on the small land bases there is little way of drawing in capital for investment.  
 First Nations peoples cannot use their land for personal loans, so without resource capital 
or outside investment, there are no funds for economic development.  This leaves the people and 
communities dependent on the federal system.  This cycle repeats and is the principal obstacle in 
economic development and self-sustainability.  Since First Nations do not own their home on 
reserves, there is no capital to establish credit.31  To compound this, there is little chance for most 
First Nations to acquire savings for business investment when they have a lower average yearly 
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income than non-First Nations in Canada.  Between 1985 and 1995, the “non-Aboriginal average 
income increased to $19,831, compared to $13,020 for Aboriginal Canadians as a whole.”32  
These numbers demonstrate that there are other areas of economic development and employment 
that warrant study with respect to First Nations peoples and communities; however, individual 
employment disparities are not the focus of the study being conducted.  It is an area that must be 
acknowledged and cannot continue to be ignored.  
The geographic location for First Nations’ reserves has been a cause for dependency 
because not all services are offered on reserve and this too has been a barrier for economic 
development.  Michael Gertler discusses rural First Nations peoples as being doubly 
marginalized as a result of the location of the reserve.  Although many reserves are in remote 
locations, they have not always been, as nearby towns that were once economic hubs are now in 
an extreme economic decline.33  Gertler explains that the other way rural First Nations peoples 
are marginalized is through the gravitation to urban centres.34  Many leave their home 
communities to seek out employment, and in many cases, this can be observed as the loss of 
human capital – as such, it is an observable impediment for economic development in First 
Nations reserve communities. 
Cornell and Kalt discuss the distance from markets and that this affects a community 
because transportation to the market is so costly.35  The cost of development of resources, and 
then for transportation from the First Nations community to local markets, needs to be 
worthwhile and profitable to be a sustainable development.  Borrows and Morales take the same 
stance as Cornell and Kalt in that they observe that “in many cases, reserves are located far from 
markets and services,” and the challenge the reserve communities face is that of  “high 
transportation costs [that] make it difficult for some Aboriginal peoples living on-reserve to 
participate in the larger market economy.”36  The remoteness of reserves is becoming less of a 
problem in Saskatchewan because many bands have bought land near or in urban centres. 
There is one other obstacle to development that First Nations communities endure, and 
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that is the governance system.  Cornell and Kalt found in their research that many First Nations 
bands “have unworkable and /or externally imposed systems of government.”37  This is 
problematic because it is hard for a political system to work when people do not feel a sense of 
ownership over the system they are using.  This is why the systems in place have brought 
corruption into band politics – corruption through band politicians and bureaucrats.38  Cornell and 
Kalt observe: “on-reservation factionalism destroys stability in tribal decisions, and 
legitimacy.”39  Borrows and Morales concur with Cornell and Kalt stating, “[e]xcessive 
factionalism has sometimes hindered stability in Aboriginal decision-making and 
development.”40  They explain that this causes an economic barrier, potentially keeping outsiders 
from investing or participating in First Nations businesses.41  This economic barrier reduces 
confidence in the band’s development and creates a risky environment for investment. 
2.4 Programming Occurring in Canada 
In Canada, the federal government has been closely involved in economic development, 
or the lack thereof, for First Nations peoples.  Prior to the 1970s, and prior to any discussion of 
TLE, the federal government was involved in programming for First Nations peoples.  In this 
earlier period, programming for First Nations was a three-pronged approach targeting the 
individual, targeting the communities, and embracing business.42  Although the programs were 
mostly developed prior to TLE discussion, much of the federal programming continued into the 
twenty-first century.   
On the individual level, the federal government introduced a program called ‘Pathways to 
Success’ that provided market training and employment-entry programs.43  Dorey would like to 
see these types of programs handed over to First Nations people so that the programs can be 
refocused from the “transition to the mainstream.”  This would make the programs more stable 
and culturally specific.44  People will be more responsive to programs that reflect their culture in 
                                                
37  Cornell and Kalt, 7.   
38  Cornell and Kalt, 7.   
39  Cornell and Kalt, 7.   
40  Borrows and Morales, 148.   
41  Borrows and Morales, 148.   
42  Dorey, 13.   
43  Dorey, 14.  Employment and Immigration Canada, 1991, Ottawa, Pathways to Success: Aboriginal 
Employment and Training Strategy: A Background Paper, Canada, Employment and Immigration Canada (Dept.) 
Public Affairs Branch. 
44  Dorey, 14.  Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, “Mainstreaming Indigeneity by Indigenizing Policymaking: 
Towards an Indigenous grounded analysis framework as policy paradigm,” in Indigenous Policy Journal XX, no. 3 
(Fall 2009): 25/45. 
 25 
various ways, more so than when they are pushed through programs that are not representative of 
their worldview, similar to what Hylton has presented. 
The community development programming developed by the federal government was 
also limited.  The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) 
administered these loan-funding programs for Indian and Inuit,45 with the intent to “improve the 
collective capacity of Aboriginal communities to attract development.”46  As First Nations 
development was quite stagnant, especially prior to the TLE negotiations in Saskatchewan, it 
became evident that the government’s development strategy for First Nations communities was 
not really creating successful business performance.  If this process were successful, more bands 
in Saskatchewan would have experienced economic development prior to the TLE settlements. 
According to Dorey, the first funding for First Nations entrepreneurs was seen in Canada 
in the middle of the 1980s with a ‘Native Economic Development Program’, followed by 
‘Industry Canada’s Aboriginal Business Canada Program’ that was first offered in 1989.47  The 
problem with this type of programming is that it is top-down from the federal government down 
to First Nations people, and is not a proper support system for economic development for First 
Nations.  There is no mention of a cultural match in these business development opportunities.  
Also, the funding system is problematic because the federal government controls the 
expenditures and has the power to cut funding at any time, and moreover has often done so.  The 
entrepreneurial support is already on the decline as the overall spending by the federal 
government is rapidly decreasing.48  With federal funding on the decline it is becoming 
increasingly important that First Nations develop strong economic development that is more self-
supporting and self-sustaining. 
Dwight Dorey discusses programming for First Nations peoples at length in 
“Development Unreserved: An Economic Development for the Twenty-First Century,” and 
begins by examining the individual programs the federal government has imposed on First 
Nations over the years.  Many of the programs that Dwight Dorey discusses can be found and 
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supported in materials produced by academics such as Jim Miller, and in government ministries, 
such as Industry Canada.49  Individual programs were administered through the federal 
government via the Indian Act.  In the 1850s, the federal government first imposed voluntary 
enfranchisement, which was used and enforced until 1951, and was not officially abolished until 
1985.  In 1920 involuntary enfranchisement was enforced as a measure for a couple years, and a 
return to voluntary enfranchisement occurred until abolished.50  Although First Nations resisted 
this policy, it was a top-down instrument that the First Nations had limited control over.  Once 
enfranchised, a person ceased to be a First Nations person under law, thus not being allowed to 
participate in the development of a First Nations economy, as they were no longer legally 
considered to be a First Nations person.51  It was thought that this policy would push First 
Nations peoples from the traditional lifestyle to the agrarian lifestyle that the federal government 
was imposing and encouraging.52  This perpetuates dependency by forcing First Nations to 
become dependent on a new economic system and causes the First Nations to rely on the federal 
government for help through this transition.  This attempted shift was not workable, and has left 
the First Nations people economically weak.  
The individual programs then shifted in the 1980s away from the social engineering 
concept to individual assistance programs.  Dorey explains this new transition as a shift towards 
economic investment into human capital that assists in labour market training and employment 
entry programs.53  These business initiatives and programs can be seen as oppressive because the 
federal government is conducting them.  Also, more programming is not necessarily good 
programming.  In fact, most of the programming to date was not helpful because it did not 
account for First Nations’ worldviews.  However, the need for this type of programming 
addresses a well-known obstacle to economic development, and that is the issue of human capital 
and workforce training.  While this type of programming was intended to help, it should first be 
tailored to the First Nations community that it is meant to help. 
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According to Cornell and Kalt, “Entrepreneurial skills and experience are scarce,”54 and 
without these skills present in the people of the community, the community will have to depend 
on outsiders.  This is not economic self-sufficiency, and is yet another form of dependency and 
an obstacle to First Nations driven development.  Both Cornell and Kalt, and Borrows and 
Morales acknowledge one other reason for a lack of human capital, outside of lack of training, 
education, or experience.  And that other reason is social problems. Social problems, such as 
alcohol, drugs, and family dysfunction contribute to the loss of human capital.55  These personal 
problems affect the community as a whole and must be acknowledged, but will not be discussed 
further as the social problems of reserve communities are not the focus of the research presented 
here. 
2.5 Elements for Successful Economic Development in the Harvard Project’s 
Nation-Building Model 
In their research, Cornell and Kalt found that there are four key elements involved in 
economic development that are required for the First Nations bands to experience success.56  
Again, just because First Nations follow particular business practices or elements does not mean 
that the business is guaranteed to be successful.  However, certain elements being present do 
contribute towards success.  The four key elements that are present in successful bands are as 
follows: -­‐ Take Control – the band assumed local autonomy and set their own direction and 
made their own decisions. -­‐ Establish Effective Institutions – setting up rules and mechanisms on how to relate 
to a community committed to business growth.  -­‐ Strategic Direction – the leaders set a vision and a mission for the community 
along with plans for the long term. -­‐ Action Oriented Leaders (AOL) – with the education, knowledge, and skills to 
carry out their roles and responsibilities for implementation of the strategic 
plan and monitoring and evaluating performance and results.57 
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Cornell and Kalt point out that these four elements require a business strategy to be chosen before 
steps can be taken to make them present.  The business strategy or philosophy chosen for an 
economic model can shape the four elements.  Once a business strategy is chosen, depending on 
the strategy, it can help determine the level of control and types of business decisions the 
community will make and what shape the four elements mentioned above will take. 
 To explore the types of business strategies that are ‘usable’ for First Nations economic 
development, one can see them transpire within what Cornell and Kalt consider being the 
‘development ingredients.’  These ingredients can shape the business strategies that take hold in 
First Nations communities.  Cornell and Kalt have broken down development into three 
categories: (1) external opportunity; (2) internal assets; and (3) development strategy.58   
Within the category of external opportunity, many of the critical factors are elements that 
have a double-edged sword effect in that the factors for success can also be the reason for 
economic challenges.  The external critical factors include: (a) political sovereignty – this 
involves the extent of control over decision-making power; (b) market opportunity – 
opportunities from assets or attributes; (c) access to financial capital – in the ability to secure 
either private or public investment; and (d) proximity to local markets – will the distance and cost 
of transportation be worthwhile?59  The external critical factors are elements that will help 
determine the business strategy possibilities.  Nevertheless, not all business strategies will be 
practical.  For instance, access to capital will play a pivotal role in the business options a First 
Nations community will have.  Any business strategy that does not account for this would be 
severely limited in scope.  
 The internal assets will determine the course of action a First Nations band will take when 
deciding upon a business plan and how governance will be organized.  This is because their 
business options will depend on what assets are readily available to them, be it natural resources, 
human capital, the institutions of governance, or the peoples’ culture.60  Human capital includes 
people with skills, knowledge, and expertise to carry out specific tasks.  Without adequate skill 
sets in the human capital area, the band must look to outsiders for help, losing some autonomy in 
the process.  In the area of capacity-building and governance, the structure of the internal assets 
will depend on leadership and human capital.  There needs to be strong governance in decision-
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making for choosing an economic development strategy, and strong governance would be based 
in the leadership and skill set of the leader(s).  Lastly, culture is an important internal asset as the 
development plan should be a cultural match with the community – culture is defined as the 
general reflections of the community, how they perceive the world and ways of knowing.61  
These three elements: human capital, governance, and community are all inter-related, and a 
good combination thereof will determine the scope of the band’s development choices.  Natural 
resources are important to have at hand, but the combination of these other three elements will be 
more important to the band in any long-term plan. 
 The development strategy is the third development ingredient that Cornell and Kalt 
discuss with respect to the Harvard Project and First Nations economic development.  There are 
two elements to this ingredient: the first being the overall economic system, which is the 
organization of the reserve economy, and the second being the choice of development activity.62  
These two elements go hand-in-hand as the type of development activity can influence the type of 
business strategy chosen, and also because the type of reserve economy can determine if the First 
Nation decides to get involved with a particular business or development opportunity.  A 
business strategy must be chosen, and it must coincide with the beliefs or visions of the 
community to ensure community support of the business.  If the opportunity can be explored 
within a business concept that the community will be able to accept, then the band is one step 
closer to successful economic development. 
 2.6 Economic Strategies for Development from the Harvard Project 
Cornell and Kalt’s research has led them to certain observations as to what is involved 
when choosing an effective development strategy.  The economic system, of which there are four 
strategies, must compliment the governance structure and vice versa for the best potential 
outcome in economic development.  The first of the four strategies discussed is the strategy of 
Federal Control.  The Harvard Project explains this strategy as the “default mode of tribal 
economic organization and historically (is) the most common.”63  This strategy designates the 
federal government as the primary decision-makers, especially when it comes to decisions about 
what business or economic ventures the band should pursue.64  This strategy of economic 
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development is often an inappropriate strategy for First Nations’ bands, as non-First Nations 
government business plans often do not culturally fit with the community’s worldview.65  This is 
not surprising, because as Dorey discussed much of the economic policy that the government 
developed was not a cultural fit and therefore did not work. 
 The next strategy to discuss is Tribal Enterprise; the First Nations band becomes the 
business developer in this strategy.  Here, the band owns and operates their own business and 
economic development.  Problems with this strategy can arise if the governing band is not 
careful.  Cornell and Kalt point out two particular problems: one, there can be a problem with 
motivating the management; and two, the First Nations government ownership makes it difficult 
at times to separate politics from the day-to-day business management.66  Although there are 
these risks, if they are readily identified any band can take preventative measures.  A solution that 
Cornell and Kalt offer for this particular problem of separating band politics from business is to 
make the band members stockholders or stakeholders.67  An alternative management system 
could be put in place where the band would “set up (an) independent board to manage tribal 
enterprises.”68  Otherwise, the best bet for success is to have the band set up a chief executive 
form of governance to carry out development plans that are separate from the band government 
itself.  To better insulate bandleaders from pressures in making executive decisions it is 
suggested that independent boards be established.69  It is important for bands to have their own 
enterprises as the business strategies and practices will better reflect community goals, rather than 
operate under an entity like the federal government which may not understand those goals.  Past 
practices under the Federal Control strategy have not been successful in promoting and 
developing economic self-sufficiency and development as its’ foundation is that of outside 
control over band control.  The Tribal Enterprise strategy is much more workable. 
 The reason why the strong chief executive form of government is an element required in 
band business ownership is because a strong governance system incorporates accountability.  
People who can assume serious responsibility for their actions will help to promote good 
decision-making for the good of the band.  Cornell and Kalt explain that culture must be an 
element involved in this type of business practice so that the business practices are seen as 
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legitimate in the eyes of the band members involved and the community that is affected by 
them.70  There still is no guarantee that the band-controlled business will be successful.  
However, confidence gained in the community can and will most likely strengthen governance 
and economic development.  As stated by Cornell and Kalt, “neither forms can guarantee that 
tribally owned businesses will be either free from politics, or successful as businesses,”71 but to 
this point, these are the best-recommended safeguards.  There will always be the risk that the 
centralized authority in this strategy will be susceptible to corruption or that decisions will be 
made to personally benefit members of the executive, including the chief.72  However, insulation 
of business from governance will increase the odds of business success. 
 Another economic strategy a band could choose for economic development is that of 
Private Enterprise with a Tribal Member owning the business.  In this case the business or 
enterprise would be owned and operated by an individual, a family or an entrepreneurship run by 
band members.73 Here, the band may buy shares in the private enterprise or give grants in return 
for a portion of its profits. According to the Harvard Project, this type of enterprise occurs in this 
small business style:  
The microenterprise strategy is particularly appropriate where cultural norms 
support individual accumulations of at least modest wealth; where individual 
achievement is honored and not cause for personal rejection; where there is 
cultural resistance to the importation of non-member management that might 
otherwise be needed, at least for a time, to run large enterprises; where larger 
businesses that require ‘bosses and workers’ hierarchies are incompatible with 
cultural standards regarding who can tell whom what to do; and where people’s 
political allegiances may not be fixed on central tribal authorities.74   
 
Cultural appropriateness is an element that keeps surfacing in the discussion of economic 
development.75  Cultural input should come from the community and not from any outside 
influence.  A culturally appropriate strategy can legitimize the business plan in the eyes of the 
community, making it easier for them to support the business venture. 
 The last economic strategy that Cornell and Kalt point out is that of Private Enterprise 
with a non-tribal member, which involves non-First Nations businesses setting up on reserve land 
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or otherwise sharing in the band’s resources, often taking the form of joint-ventures.76  Michael 
Gertler explains that joint-ventures can cause problems for First Nations development because 
non-First Nations investors may try to do everything their way by using their “experience and 
muscle” to be in a position of control as opposed to being culturally sensitive.77  This 
development strategy is often used in areas surrounding manufacturing and resource processing, 
but is only recommended for bands are: self-confident, have the cultural standards that align with 
the business venture (especially big business with outsiders), and can handle the hierarchy of 
bosses and workers.78  This strategy will not work for small bands or bands that are still focusing 
on cultural preservation, as the culture would still be in a position of being threatened through 
loss of language or tradition.  The band should be in a strong prominent position, or the band may 
get lost in the process or lose control of the economic development that is taking place. 
2.7 Other Elements to Consider 
Dwight Dorey has similar views to those expressed in the Harvard Project in that 
economic success will come to First Nations peoples by having them in a position to control the 
business venture and/or the natural resources.  Dorey sees that there needs to be four decisions 
that need to be addressed, and by doing so, First Nations should be able to be in a position to 
exercise economic development.  The first decision Dorey discusses is the “decision to accept 
that Aboriginal economic performance requires access to resources and control over lands.”79  
The answer for this, according to Dorey, is the requirement of new agreements concerning lands 
and resources.  He explains, “Few reject this idea that resources and control over land is a crucial 
determinant of society’s economic performance and capacity for self-reliance.”80  Roger Maaka 
and Augie Fleras support is by explaining that land is important to the big picture of exercising 
self-determination.81  This is why TLE is pivotal to the capacity-building for successful 
development and enterprise.  It is a return of land and resources to First Nations based on what 
was promised to them via longstanding Treaty agreements that were made with the federal 
government more than 100 years ago.  It now presents access to capital in various ways to allow 
for economic development that can be controlled by First Nations’ initiatives.  Through TLE, 
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capital is brought in to purchase land owed, and this land can then be leased to start a cash flow 
for First Nations bands.  This connects to the Harvard Project’s first key element present in 
economically successful bands, the idea of First Nations taking back control to make their own 
decisions.  Dorey explains that land is essential for becoming self-reliant, and that control over 
lands has to be regained for First Nations development to succeed. 
 The next decision Dorey presents is the need to address governance and ‘Aboriginal’ 
institutions.  He explains that ‘Aboriginal’ governance should be accountable, transparent, and 
open.82  This form of effective governance is the concept of a strong, secure government that 
Cornell and Kalt discuss in the Harvard Project, bringing particular attention to their list of key 
elements present in successful bands.  Effective governance is directly connected to establishing 
effective institutions, and governance is a form of an institution.  Dorey comes to the idea of 
accountability by pointing out that many First Nations governments do not practice this but that it 
is a capacity that is essential in the exercise of authority.83  The practice of good governance will 
enable First Nations to have confidence in their governing system and as Dorey explains “[g]ood 
governance is essential for development.”84  It would not only instil confidence from within, but 
also instil confidence in potential outside investors of the band.  Robert Chaskin takes this one 
step further in the discussion of ‘Building Community Capacity’, as will be discussed later. 
 Decision number three for Dorey is that all levels of government, First Nations and non-
First Nations, should work towards an equitable participation in development projects,85 which 
could include the implementation of inclusive decision-making strategies and creation of job 
opportunities.  This decision is not that different than the fourth element Cornell and Kalt 
presented when discussing the elements present in economically successful bands.  This is 
because it would take action-oriented leaders to implement these kinds of decisions, as a certain 
level of comprehension of responsibility is required and they would need to possess certain skill 
sets to be successful.  When a strong leader is in place that has confidence in the decisions they 
make, the community would be more inclined to place trust in their leader and the skills they 
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possess. 
 The fourth and final decision Dorey says has to be made for First Nations communities to 
be in a position for economic development success is that “Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
government efforts to manage natural resources must be co-ordinated and harmonized.”86  The 
direction or the business strategy that is chosen will determine this.  This relates to the Harvard 
Project’s ‘strategic direction’, the third element present in economically successful bands. Any 
particular path chosen to account for resource management would not reflect a short-term policy 
arrangement, just as the strategic direction in the Harvard Project is not a short-term community 
plan. Resource management is always a long-term plan.  Harmonization is significant because in 
many areas of Treaty settlement – provincial, federal, and municipal – arrangements must 
compliment each other in order to have functioning relationships that are productive.  Without 
such harmonization a lot of time will be wasted with parties engaged in political battles and 
heavy-handed posturing.   
Robert Chaskin and his collaborators explain that governance is a portion of the bigger 
picture when looking at community sustainability.  According to Chaskin, a community involves 
certain elements: stability, safety, density, opportunity structure, migration patterns, and class and 
power distribution.87  These elements shape communities, and can either constrain or promote 
community development.  This is dependent upon the presence of and the form that the element 
takes.  For example, stability could be measured in a lack thereof, or it could be measured by 
assessing whether or not capital is invested from outsiders.  Stability is a good example from Mr. 
Chaskin’s list because it is one of the most important elements for investors.  Stability can be 
seen as an element of financial safety and predictability because if there is little stability then 
there is a greater risk of losing an investment.  Borrows and Morales discuss success in First 
Nations economic development in a very similar way to Chaskin in that the “development 
requires institutions that are stable, fair, efficient and reasonable.”88  Cornell and Kalt explain that 
these institutions must be “capable of protecting investors and entrepreneurs from political 
interference with their capital commitments, and capable of enforcing workable business.”89  
There is a level of security needed for investment to take place.  Deference to and respect for 
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these elements as listed will instil confidence and legitimacy in outside investors and they will be 
able to see a business venture as less risky or less susceptible to band politics.   
 From here, Chaskin, and Borrows and Morales, take two different directions in the 
discussion of First Nations economic development.  Chaskin goes in the direction of community 
capacity-building by highlighting elements that are central to the development strategies such as 
“leadership, organizational development, organizing for action, and organizational 
collaboration.”90  Similarities to the Harvard Project are drawn upon, in that the key elements for 
capacity-building are “strong leadership, organizational development through the establishment 
of institutions and processes for good governance, and doing what is necessary to put the plans 
into action.”91   
       Borrows and Morales expand this discussion of successful First Nations by looking at 
specific cultural undertones that could operate in tandem with First Nations political control – 
political control being necessary to protect the concept of citizenship.92  This is not to say that 
Cornell and Kalt or the Harvard Project did not discuss the importance of culture and cultural 
match, but Borrows and Morales take it a little deeper by discussing the concept of learning 
culturally significant approaches from the ancient teachings. 
Borrows and Morales introduce a specific element of culture when examining how culture 
needs to fit the economic strategy for First Nations in economic development.  When looking at 
culture and cultural fit, Borrows and Morales demonstrate how the ancient teachings should be 
applied to economic development.  “Many Aboriginal peoples have teachings related to their 
growth and development.  While some of these teachings must be turned aside as irrelevant or 
inappropriate because they do not accord with contemporary Aboriginal sensibilities, others are 
of great significance.”93  It is acknowledged that not all teachings from the past are useful in this 
modern era.  However, Borrows and Morales emphasize the importance of the ancient teachings 
because some are very relevant to long-term First Nations development, such as lessons “that 
bring peace, prosperity, responsibility, and success.”94  These ancient teachings have left imprints 
in culture, and if some teachings are resurrected and used, the worldview that was built upon the 
teachings will be reflected in the economic development.  Thus, using the ancient teachings as a 
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business strategy foundation may reinforce the business’s legitimacy within the community. 
2.8 Breaking the Dependency 
Stephen Cornell not only explains how dependency exists as a political and economic 
mechanism, but he also provides some ideas on “Escaping the Dependency Leash.”  To break this 
dependency from the government, under this model, two areas need to be developed.  The first 
area to develop is the need to provide economic opportunity – First Nations need business 
prospects and subsistence resources in order to grow.95  The other area that needs to be developed 
is funding for First Nations governments, which will help enable and develop “law-making, 
decision-making and implementation, judicial function and enforcement, and service 
provision.”96  The economic development is part and parcel to breaking the dependency on the 
federal government for First Nations, because it not only develops their economic strength and 
creates economic freedom, but it also helps in the area of governance.  First Nations governance 
that is able to break from the federal government, secure and invest funds flowing in from 
development, take control of decisions and is generally self-determining will be able to shore up 
economic development.  Economic development and governance are completely interdependent 
in terms of obtaining economic success. 
 There are many reasons for the economic hardship First Nations peoples face.  Most of 
the hardship is rooted in dependency – a dependency that the federal government created and 
controlled for a number of years.  The federal government’s primary motive for creating a 
dependency was to secure land and put First Nations into an easy position to be assimilated.  
Ingrained in this dependency are several developmental roadblocks that First Nations peoples' 
face, all preventing economic success.  Such roadblocks to development include: programming 
and policy; lack of financial capital; lack of human capital; and governance structuring.  The poor 
quality land bases and a lack of control over resources confound these roadblocks.  Cornell and 
Kalt and the Harvard Project explain, along with other academics, that there are ways of breaking 
dependency and ways to create successful economic development when certain key elements are 
present.  However, following the business strategies, setting up governance structures best suited 
for them, and acquiring a strong resource base through land or resources does not guarantee 
economic success for First Nations.  What is important for First Nations development is to break 
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the dependency that has been created.  What can support this break of dependency is ensuring 
that the business development and governance institutions are cultural matches for those 
involved.   
 Between literature and research from Cornell and Kalt, Borrows and Morales, Barron and 
Garcea, Brian Calliou, and Dwight Dorey at least one now has the ability to analyze the different 
components involved in economic development regardless of whether or not they hinder or 
advance development.  Knowing about these components is half the battle.  Through all the 
discussion of economic strategies brought forward by the academics, common threads include the 
ideas of capacity-building and regaining control over businesses, and lands and resources – these 
are the elements that are needed for First Nations bands to be economically successful and break 
dependency.  All of this is backed by a community confidence in a business system, a confidence 
that can be fostered in cultural matches that align with governance and development. 
For First Nations to be economically successful there needs to be a strong business plan in 
place, and preferably a plan that is a good cultural match; however, even a good cultural match 
and business plan cannot guarantee success.  One element that would help prevent business 
failure that must be acknowledged is good governance, as it is the backbone of First Nations 
communities.  However, even if a band does everything right – economic success is still a small 
matter of good fortune.  The Harvard Project, under the advisement of Cornell and Kalt, has 
researched economic development in the United States, and some cases in Canada.  It has 
discovered that “economic development had to be part of community development and self-
determination,” which involves “a well-governed and stable community with a vision to grow 
businesses.”97  Again, there is no guarantee that First Nations’ economic development and 
business will be successful, but those bands that are successful have certain elements present in 
the organization of the band and business.  Whether it is separation between band politics and 
business, or having a good cultural match, it has been established that the key to successful 
economic development will always depend primarily on a great amount of motivation and self-
determination by the band and its members. 
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Chapter 3  
MLCN: A BAND USING TLE TO BREAK DEPENDENCY 
3.1 Introduction 
Some bands in Saskatchewan started to settle their Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) before 
the signing of the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (TLEFA) in 1992, but that 
does not mean they cannot be considered a TLE band.  In fact, Muskeg Lake Cree Nation 
(MLCN) started their settlement prior to 1992, and they still signed the agreement in 1992 as an 
entitlement band.  MLCN is an excellent community to use as a case study when examining TLE 
and the TLEFA because as an early signatory entitlement band, they were the first in 
Saskatchewan and Canada to establish an urban reserve for economic development and since 
their settlement is now twenty years old, the band’s sustainability can start to be measured.  
MLCN has been able to focus on economic development by using assets derived from the TLE 
settlement, developing layers of business and managing to separate business from band politics as 
will be discussed further.  The band has been successful in economic development because they 
blended business strategies and they have incorporated the band’s worldview, which has allowed 
for the community to develop a confidence in the band’s economic endeavours.  In this way, 
MLCN began breaking dependency with the Crown. 
This chapter explores how MLCN’s economic schemes reflect the four strategies 
presented by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt in the Harvard Project on Indian Economic 
Development.  When a band is selecting a business strategy for economic development, they are 
not restricted to one strategy, but instead should blend whatever strategies are needed according 
to the community’s objectives and economic goals.  It is important to see how MLCN has used 
business strategies to shape their economic development, but it is also important to see how the 
government has created room for bands to start breaking dependency from the Crown.  The 
‘Made in Saskatchewan Approach’ was an avenue created for parties to sit and negotiate various 
levels of self-determination and governance subsequent to successful demonstration of economic 
and decision-making progress that resulted from the TLEFA.  Self-determination in the context 
of this subject matter involves the capacity for decision-making with strategic direction for the 
future of the First Nations band – i.e.: creating band-specific economic goals.  Self-government 
more specifically refers to the release of power by the federal government and their recognition 
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of a negotiated self-government that is determined by specific agreements with First Nations 
bands. 
To illustrate how bands have been using their TLE settlements, a case model was 
selected.  It is through the case model of MLCN, and its background, that it becomes clear as to 
why MLCN is often held up as the example of a successful TLE band.1  This chapter works 
through the layers of business, and MLCN is using a variety of economic strategies.  The 
settlement and the urban reserve creation begin the discussion to explain how the band is starting 
to break their dependency with the Crown.  The break from dependency and the confidence that 
is being created is a desired outcome by all parties involved in the negotiation process as can be 
seen in the development of the ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach, and if it were not so, then the 
‘Made in Saskatchewan Approach’ would not have been developed.  It is important that when a 
band is deemed a success in their economic development, that it is also from the band’s 
perspective and not just outsiders.  For the band to be truly successful in business and economic 
development, the community members must hold a confidence in the system, and a strategy must 
be chosen that culturally fits with the community engaged in the development projects. 
3.2 Background 
Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) is a band located in central Saskatchewan in Treaty 
Six territory.  MLCN Chief Kitowehow (1876-1879) signed Treaty Six August 23, 1876, and 
subsequently had a reserve surveyed for the First Nations band – 26,880 acres,2 based on 640 
acres per family of five, or 128 acres per person.3  Many of the problems surrounding land are 
due to population counts determined at that time by surveyors who used inaccurate paylists, 
leaving the band with less land than what was owed to them for a reserve.  Bands in 
Saskatchewan who have shortfall claims of acres owing for reserve allocation are Treaty Land 
Entitlement Claims (TLE Claims).4  The TLE owing was the basis for the TLEFA and the 
catalyst that led to the process of more efficient TLE settlement claims in Saskatchewan.   
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Muskeg Lake Cree Nation was an active player in the development of TLE in 
Saskatchewan as it initiated one of the earlier claims in the province.  Not long after the 
establishment of the Specific Claims policy (1973), the federal government agreed to make lands 
available for the settlement of TLE Claims, and that they would be using the population counts 
from December 31, 1976, for determining the shortfall acres owed.5  In 1983 the federal 
government recognized that MLCN had a valid claim, with 48,640 acres owed to them from the 
1976 population base.6  Muskeg Lake had, by 1984, made selection of Crown land for some of 
the shortfall acres owing.  In 1988, an agreement was reached for a transfer of land in Sutherland, 
a suburb of Saskatoon, consisting of 35 acres.   
It is in the elements of the TLEFA that the economic groundwork was laid for the 
development and management of land, businesses and assets.  This made TLE a springboard for 
economic development, and a conductor for breaking dependency from the Crown.  It is not that 
urban reserves did not exist prior to the MLCN settlement.  The previous urban reserves were 
pre-existing reserves that had their borders surrounded by municipalities through municipality 
border expansion.  The MLCN urban reserve that was created in Saskatoon in 1988 was 
established with the specific intention of becoming a First Nations economic development 
project.7 
3.3 How MLCN Uses the Economic Strategies 
 The Harvard Project discussed four economic strategies for First Nations bands to choose 
from when establishing their economic development.8  MLCN has employed elements out of all 
four business strategies rather than using just one strategy.  The band has been able to insulate 
their economic development from band politics and they have modelled the business plan around 
the band’s worldview.  This method helps to create community support for the economic 
development and confidence in the decisions being made.  The band outlines their community’s 
business initiatives and goals on their website, and development strategies are reflective of the 
community’s world philosophies.  Confidence is key in First Nations economic development 
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because business cannot grow if there is no confidence from internal and external bodies; i.e. 
band members, members of government, businesses and financial institutions.  All of these 
players are involved with and trust MLCN business because of the MLCN’s use of the four 
business strategies. 
3.3.1 Federal Control 
Federal control has most often been the default business strategy for First Nations bands 
because the federal government has default control over the First Nations peoples through the 
Indian Act, and because the federal government expects to have input into any dollars they give 
First Nations for spending.  However, this is changing.  As bands have opportunities to create 
economic development, the federal government is demonstrating a confidence in the way outside 
funding is beginning to work.  Outside funding agencies, such as the government of Canada’s 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and the Finance Minister for 
Canada, have contributed to MLCN and some of their initiatives, demonstrating that confidence 
from outside organizations for the band’s economic development exists.  In 2004, MLCN and 
Canadian Magnetic Imaging co-operated to buy a Magnetic Resonance Imaging device (MRI), 
and establish a clinic in Saskatoon.9  At this point the MRI clinic plans have been put on hold 
until an agreement can be reached with respect to jurisdictional issues related to the health 
system.10  This collaboration created some controversy as some saw this as a privatization of 
healthcare in Saskatchewan.  Lester Lafond, a business advisor to MLCN, and also a MLCN 
band member, defends the MRI on the basis that it promotes self-determination and self-
governance.  He states, “this is not a private clinic, we are a government, and we will establish a 
Crown Corporation to own and operate this machine.  We’re trying to find an arrangement that is 
mutual and beneficial [to us and the Province].”11  The federal government demonstrated their 
openness to the possibility of First Nations bands running a responsible medical clinic by 
providing $15,000.00 for a MLCN clinic feasibility study by DIAND.12  This is a modified 
version of the Federal Control strategy offered by the Harvard Project in that it does involve non-
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First Nations governance funding, but the funding is not completely under the control of the non-
First Nations government.13  While there is federal involvement there is not complete federal 
control over the funding. 
 This has not been the only way that federal government has demonstrated confidence for 
the MLCN band and its economic development.  It was reported in mid-2005 that the federal 
government was to contribute $392,700.00 to help develop infrastructure for further development 
of the MLCN urban reserve.14  Then Minister of Finance, Ralph Goodale, made this contribution 
on behalf of Andy Scott (the then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), as 
Goodale saw the contribution as an opportunity to improve the living conditions for the 
community members.  He stated “Our investment in infrastructure on the Asimakaniseekan 
Askiy Reserve (MLCN urban reserve located in the Sutherland neighbourhood of Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan), will create more economic opportunities for members of the Muskeg Lake Cree 
Nation and the people of Saskatoon.”15  The federal government took this opportunity to 
acknowledge everything that the MLCN urban reserve has done in the areas of economic and 
social development.  The federal government also took this as an opportunity to discuss 
relationships and partnerships and how they can benefit everyone – that the expansion of urban 
reserve development will “make a good relationship even better.”16 
 Chief Ledoux (the then chief of MLCN) acknowledged how the federal investment in 
infrastructure will help the community meet their long-term goals.17  Ledoux explains, “Muskeg 
Lake Cree Nation understands economic development is a key factor in improving living 
standards and building self-sufficiency…the expansion of our urban Reserve will support and 
stimulate business activity that will help bring about true independence for our people.”18  It 
appears that the bands see this as an opportunity of actualizing their goal of self-determination.  
In other words, this was a contribution from the federal government to help break the dependency 
relationship the band has with the federal government. 
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3.3.2 Tribal Enterprise 
As per the MLCN settlement agreement, the band established a corporation to handle 
band economic development called ‘Aspen Developments.’  This is the organization that holds 
the lease of the Sutherland property.  The band decided to make the corporation band-owned and 
controlled, which allowed for community-based benefits.  This roughly translates to the 
community ‘owning’ the band business as a collective.  As individuals, there is access to capital 
for business in private entrepreneurship.  The Tribal Enterprise strategy is the second strategy 
outlined in the Harvard Project.  The band has taken an additional safeguard by using a 
corporation to control business ownership by making the band members shareholders.19  The 
philosophy that is demonstrated is also reflected in the MLCN ‘Missions and Vision for 
Economic Development.’  “The Mission of MLCN Economic Development initiatives is to 
create collective wealth and to provide opportunities for individuals to create wealth.”20  Included 
in this mission statement is an affirmation that the band created their independence by seizing the 
opportunity for TLE settlement.  “MLCN will ensure this [wealth] happens ... by increasing their 
own capacity to support initiatives and programs to enable MLCN to have increasing amounts of 
control over the future.”21  It appears this is already happening as there is funding for community 
members that wish to create small businesses.  This speaks to breaking the dependency and 
creating self-determination, as well as demonstrates the need to do it in MLCN’s own way by 
creating their own, unique model that is a cultural fit with their community. 
 MLCN determines what they deem as success for their band.  The band determines that 
“Economic Development will have established feedback loops that evaluate programs constantly 
with regards to their success rate and what they contribute to entrepreneurship and wealth 
creation.”22  The feedback loop is a means of communication as it is a feedback of progress, 
which can inform certain decisions for the future with respect to the development being 
examined, supervised or terminated.  The progress of economic development is transmitted back 
to the people making decisions and the community so that they can make informed decisions 
about the direction for the future.  This allows for a form of transparency and functions as a 
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checks and balances procedure.  It is difficult to hide wrongdoings when all the information on 
the matter must be made available to the people.  The band’s economic development plan appears 
capable of enjoying perpetual prosperity as it has now become organic and self-propelling for the 
community.  As long as the business succeeds and contributes to the community, then everyone 
succeeds. 
There is a bottom dollar amount when considering success, as any business would have, 
but it is clear in this case that community contribution plays just as large of a role in the formula 
for this community’s success.  Community contribution is important because the profits that are 
returned back to the community go into community development.  As part of the business 
initiative, when a band member accesses funds to establish a business, they are expected to return 
a portion of the profits back to the community.  The band owns the development corporation, but 
the development corporation runs and makes the decisions about the band’s economic 
development.  There is a separation between the political arm of the band government and the 
development corporation.  By operating economic development in this fashion, it allows for the 
business development to be arms length from the MLCN band politics.  Aspen Developments is 
the first development corporation for MLCN; a second corporation of Creek Investments Limited 
was created in 1993.23  The band continues to add to new development initiatives to its repertoire 
such as the Muskeg Lake Electrical Company and the Muskeg Lake Cree Nations Care Home 
Corporation.24  The fact that the corporations are expanding according to the band’s goals and 
that they see the development as a success demonstrates that the feedback loops are working. 
 3.3.3 Tribal Member Owning the Business 
MLCN has been able to assist in the economic development of the band through the 
development corporations it has established, and as a result the corporations have contributed to 
business initiatives in the urban environment.  This incorporates the third strategy in the Harvard 
Project, that of Private Enterprise with a Tribal Member owning the business.25  According to the 
MLCN website, there are “more than 40 (forty) successful business organizations and this 
number continues to grow as development continues on the Urban Lands.”26  As of late 2008, the 
                                                
23  Thompson. 
24   Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, “Businesses,” in Muskeg Lake Cree Nation – Businesses and Partnerships, 
Muskeg Lake Cree Nation Archives Inc., 2008 www.muskeglake.com/ml_businesses.html (accessed November 17, 
2008).   
25  Cornell and Kalt, 39.   
26  Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, “Muskeg Lake Cree Nation Urban Lands”, in Muskeg Lake Cree Nation – 
 45 
MLCN website provides this comprehensive list of established businesses on Muskeg Lake urban 
lands, which all contribute to the community’s success: -­‐ Petro Canada Service Station – “CreeWay Gas” -­‐ Dry Cleaning – “Phoenix Dry Cleaning” -­‐ Art and Framing – Ernie Scoles Gallery -­‐ Dental Office  -­‐ Medical Clinic/Family Doctor’s Office -­‐ SGI Insurance Broker/Motor License Issuer -­‐ Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) -­‐ Saskatchewan Indian Equity Foundation (SIEF) -­‐ First Nation’s Agriculture Council of Saskatchewan Inc. (FNACS) -­‐ Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) -­‐ Peace Hills Trust Bank -­‐ Saskatoon Tribal Council (STC) -­‐ Kocsis Transport – Long Haul Trucking Company -­‐ Three Legal Firms -­‐ Film Production – “Blue Hills Productions” -­‐ Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies (SIIT)27 
It is obvious by the number of businesses developed, and the land being leased to organizations 
such as SIIT, or SIGA, that MLCN business enterprises have been successful in keeping up an 
economic momentum as more economic opportunities emerge.  By increasing their land base 
through the TLE process, MLCN is now able to produce economic opportunity by providing 
access to capital for business development.  Exclusive MLCN decision-making powers are 
provided for in the settlement agreement, which is the foundation of the confidence in MLCN 
business developments.  The success and developing confidence demonstrates that the economic 
strategy fits with the community worldview.  As well, it demonstrates the strategy chosen was the 
best choice for MLCN as it also instils confidence in funding benefactors outside of the First 
Nations community. 
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3.3.4 Private Enterprise with a non-Tribal Member 
Partnerships do not only occur between the band and the provincial, federal and 
municipality governments, but also with development corporations from other bands.  These 
partnerships between band corporations demonstrate a confidence between bands with respect to 
economic development.  This is the fourth strategy demonstrated in the Harvard Project – Private 
Enterprise with a non-Tribal member.28  This strategy usually involves co-operatives, 
partnerships and joint ventures, including joint ventures with other bands.  An example of this is 
the partnership between MLCN, Whitecap Dakota First Nation, and the Lac La Ronge Indian 
Band in the Dakota Dunes Golf Links.29  Although the partnership is between bands, the 
partnership is an initiative by the Whitecap community through the development of a ‘land use 
planning study’.30  What this partnership demonstrates is the confidence that is held between the 
bands that exists as a result of confidence from their communities.  A business would not extend 
too far without community confidence.  When the community has control over and can shape the 
business, it has a stake in prosperous economic development – a prosperity that can help 
strengthen and build communities. 
 3.4 MLCN’s Reserve Creation and Settlement 
Lack of capital is most often the reason First Nations bands struggle to create economic 
development for their people.  Through the money received for purchasing lands owed on TLE 
settlements, bands now have access to capital.  This has cleared a barrier to economic 
development and has allowed for the process of breaking dependency.  According to MLCN, 
there were five major elements present in the land entitlement agreement made:  
(1) The federal government set aside land for partial fulfilment of the reserve land owing 
on MLCN’s TLE;  
(2) MLCN was to lease land to a development company owned entirely by the band for 
industrial park development;  
(3) The band was to determine lease agreements through member votes;  
(4) A service agreement was to be established with the City for services in the way of 
infrastructure; and 
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(5) Development needed to be in accordance with the laws and bylaws of the province 
and the City.31   
One important decision a band must make is to pick a development strategy, and one that allows 
for enough transparency to ensure the continued confidence of the band.  There also has to be a 
cultural match for the band involved and the business plan they are considering.  MLCN decided 
to have complete band control of development corporations.  This allowed for large decisions to 
be made by the collective.  This is done through community committees and boards that represent 
the community as a whole.32  Band economic development is guaranteed and protected by 
providing transparency in having a member-wide referendum concerning the use of lands.  By 
negotiating services and infrastructure, the band is negotiating their political position within the 
Canadian governance structure.  One major point key academics in the field make about First 
Nations development is that the First Nations bands are land poor, a problem being rectified 
through the fulfilment of Treaties and the TLE process.  This fulfilment creates the foundation for 
Saskatchewan First Nations bands to create economic development by providing access to equity 
and assets. 
Once MLCN acquired the land in Sutherland to help fulfil Treaty obligations, the federal 
government still had to be converted to reserve status.  A band referendum was held October 15, 
1990, to convert the land to reserve status and was passed in the community with a majority 
vote.33  The Privy Council then officially established the reserve August 13, 1991, creating 
reserve # 102A, Asimakaniseekan Askiy – Soldier’s Land, in memory of the veterans that served 
in wars from MLCN.34  This created the first Saskatchewan urban reserve.35 According to Lester 
Lafond, the negotiation process for the development of this reserve was mostly positive and 
cordial.  However, developing and implementing the jurisdictional agreements was time 
consuming.36  Enough time has passed to begin studying the sustainability of the settlement and 
development process of MLCN.   
 MLCN’s agreement for the TLE came not too long after a Protocol of Agreement was 
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entered and as discussions concerning a province-wide settlement system was being established.  
In June 1989, the Office of the Treaty Commissioner was established to encourage bilateral 
negotiations between FSIN and the federal government.37  This development led to the event of 
January 1991 when “the Government of Canada, FSIN and the Assembly of Entitlement Chiefs 
signed a Protocol of Agreement which would govern the aspects of negotiations for the Treaty 
Land Entitlement Framework Agreement.”38  These successful events were the ‘catalyst’ to the 
negotiations that took place throughout 1991-92, concluding on September 22, 1992, with the 
TLEFA being signed in the presence of: Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (1984-1993); 
Roy Romanow, Premier of Saskatchewan (1991-2001); Roland Crowe, the Chief of FSIN (1986-
1994); and twenty-two entitlement bands.39  A specific formula was reached in the TLEFA for 
divvying up land owed, along with an agreement that works in conjunction with the TLEFA – a 
‘Band Specific Trust Agreement’.  In order to ratify any TLEFA settlement, the Band Specific 
Trust Agreement must be voted on and ratified by band members and there must be no doubt of 
majority in the ratification.40 
 For MLCN, the Muskeg Lake Treaty Land Entitlement Specific Agreement “was ratified 
and entered into on June 25, 1993,” and now the band and trustees govern the band and its 
entitlement money through the Band Trust Agreement.41  Prior to the shortfall acres acquisition, 
“the capital funds could only be used for land purchases, [and] the purchase of land 
improvements.”42  According to MLCN, they met their shortfall acreage September of 1997, 
which has now left MLCN with “choices for the expenditures of the remaining TLE settlement 
dollars.”43  This leaves capital for further land purchases, profits of which can be used to invest in 
other private enterprises within the band. 
 3.5 Breaking Dependency 
The economic development that happened on MLCN’s urban reserve was a result of TLE 
dollars.  TLE dollars have been the foundation for economic development for many bands in 
Saskatchewan.  Many bands are also realizing the economic and developmental potential 
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involved in establishing urban reserves, and that urban reserves encourage economic self-
sufficiency and self-determination.  There are two key components to breaking dependency:  
(1) Through control over decision making-power; and  
(2) Through capacity of decision-making power.   
This expanding power over self is a result of access to dollars that are made available from TLE 
settlements. 
 Discussions and analysis are developing surrounding the level of success and life 
improvement for First Nations in Saskatchewan as a result of TLE settlements.44  Western 
Economic Diversification Canada, a federal government department, has released a report: “Have 
Urban Reserves Made a Difference?” The report examines the economic and social impact of 
urban reserves on First Nations communities.  It was established that there is “more potential for 
self-generating revenue (on urban reserves) than on rural land reserves.”45  Asimakaniseekan 
Askiy is the urban reserve that is held up as a model of success.46  This success can be easily 
measured by looking back at the raw land with which the community began and by looking now 
at the developments and infrastructure on that land that are estimated to be worth 18 million 
dollars.47  Urban reserves are acknowledged for the way they have increased employment 
opportunities, especially for First Nations peoples.  It has stimulated economic growth and 
development through taxation benefits, and supported an environment for First Nations’ owned 
businesses.  It is believed that this growth and strategy has the potential to encourage youth to 
become entrepreneurs.48  This is reflected in the amount of private enterprise being developed by 
band members of MLCN. The band is building a stable and profitable future. 
 What is really interesting about this report is that the federal government acknowledges 
the role urban reserves play in the reduction of dependency.  In a section of the report titled 
‘Community and Social Impacts’, the federal government mentions how the economic success of 
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urban reserves could reduce dependency on federal government funding.49  The discussion 
continues by explaining that it is expected that urban reserves will raise the standard of living as 
the band acquires fiscal assets resulting from their continued operation.  What this means is that 
the economic success of urban reserves increases people’s ability to contribute to the community 
and assist in the cultural and political objectives of the band.50  The federal government 
acknowledges the benefits of urban reserves in contributing to First Nations governance by 
stating that “urban reserves also encourage a more structured governance model.”51  The 
acknowledgement of and continued support detailing how urban reserves help to break 
dependency and promote structured band governance shows that the federal government is 
supportive of self-sufficiency and self-determination for Saskatchewan First Nations. 
 The last area of the federal report is titled ‘Impacts on the Communities in which Urban 
Reserves are Established.’  This section assesses how urban reserves have impacted 
municipalities, relationships between governments, the trust or confidence exhibited by some 
communities, and the misunderstandings in other urban areas.52  Not all communities have been 
supportive of urban reserves.  However, some communities were able to see the benefits that 
urban reserves created for them in revenue, and were not as resistant or difficult during 
negotiations.   
In this report released by the federal government, one is able to not only see how urban 
reserves have contributed to economic development, but also how the urban reserves have 
contributed to breaking dependency from the federal government and how they have 
strengthened First Nations governance and elements of self-determination.  A strong government 
with their own finances allows for independent decision-making and removes the need for the 
federal government to control all elements of First Nations life and order. 
 The Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce has also completed their own background 
report on urban reserves about the impact they have had and how they have been functioning.  
This report acknowledges, “[t]here is little hard research on the overall success of the concept but 
it is widely held by those close to the issue that the benefits are real.”53  It is predicted that more 
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time needs to pass before we can measure the success in long-term results for First Nations and 
their communities, as the concept of urban reserves is still new.  Many First Nations bands in 
Saskatchewan are still in the settlement or development phase.  Once there is more data available, 
a more accurate picture of urban reserves and their success in economic development will be able 
to be addressed.  It will take time for other bands in Saskatchewan to reach the development 
stages that MLCN has reached. 
 The report presented in 2008 by the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce provides a 
background on the history of TLE and the TLEFA and it explains that: 
According to the City of Saskatoon, in addition to fulfilling original Treaty commitments, 
Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) agreements have already led to greater economic and 
social independence and self-sufficiency for Saskatchewan First Nations.54   
This report expresses the City of Saskatoon’s ‘Strategic Plan’ and how they are establishing and 
necessitating a mutually beneficial relationship and co-operation with the First Nations peoples.  
This is demonstrated by explaining how the TLEFA works with respect to arrangements made 
between municipalities and First Nations bands – including issues and concerns made from other 
businesses in the neighbourhood (i.e. with respect to taxation and product sales such as tobacco).  
The report concludes that urban reserves are beneficial economically for First Nations bands and 
non-First Nations governments, as bands such as MLCN have been able to reduce unemployment 
numbers.55  This report acknowledges that there still are problems with public support for urban 
reserves, but points out that “the growth of urban Reserves are a fact and deemed by those in the 
First Nations economic development field to be a valuable part of the growth of Aboriginal 
business in the Province.”56  It is basically expressed that, despite the lack of public support, the 
TLEFA and urban reserves have been successful thus far, and beneficial for not only First 
Nations people, but for all Saskatoon citizens.  According to the report, urban reserves are a 
required element in the economic success for First Nations.  They provide First Nations bands 
with access to markets that hey do not have in their rural communities.  Urban reserves will 
continue to play an important role in economic development and self-sufficiency in the fight to 
break dependency. 
 It has been acknowledged that not only does First Nations economic development require 
a good governance system, but strong communal leadership is also needed in order to break 
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dependency from the federal government.  Academics acknowledge the importance of a secure 
governance system.  As David Hawkes points out, “There is increasing evidence worldwide that 
socio-economic well-being is directly linked to ‘good governance’,” and Hawkes supports this 
position by quoting from the findings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).57  
With such a link to governance, First Nations economic development cannot be discussed 
without discussing governance and the road to self-determination.  There must be confidence by 
the community in the business strategy chosen, as well as confidence in the governance system 
that is involved in business strategy selection – including the area of cultural match. 
 In Canada, the Indian Act controls the rules, regulations and management of First Nations 
governance.  The Indian Act lays out the rules for band governance along with many other rules 
First Nations peoples must abide by.58  If First Nations bands want to modify their government 
structure, the First Nations leaders must modify it in accordance with the Indian Act while trying 
to remain culturally attuned to the communities they represent.  It is because of the Indian Act 
that First Nations bands must negotiate self-government with the federal and provincial 
governments.  Unless a band can negotiate their way out of the Indian Act they remain under the 
control of non-First Nations governments in some way or fashion.  
Brian Calliou points out what First Nations bands can do to negotiate self-governance as 
part of a land claims settlement.  This could be an option in Saskatchewan with the TLEFA.59  A 
successful use of this negotiation tactic can be seen in the taxation arrangements that have been 
made though TLE.  As previously mentioned, tax compensation arrangements had been made in 
the TLE settlements with municipalities in Saskatchewan.  Also, bands such as MLCN have been 
able to create their own taxation through taxing businesses, goods and services.  This is relevant 
because it is through this tax foundation that bands can secure revenues that can be used to make 
a band self-sustaining, or at least to help fund programs and services.  Calliou addresses this topic 
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by explaining, “many Aboriginal community leaders are taking a pragmatic, or business approach 
to self-government and are achieving economic success as a result, generating wealth to create 
their own source of revenue.”60  This, as Calliou discusses, demonstrates a vision of self-
government to break monetary dependency with government agencies.  This is a reflection of the 
views of the First Nations leaders as they “see successful business and economic development as 
a key to true self-determination and freedom from dependence upon government transfer 
payments.”61  There needs to be the governance in place for successful economic development, 
and in turn, that economic development will enable stronger governance.  
 Good business development supports good governance and the two elements involved in 
breaking dependency support each other creating a strong self-determination – self-determination 
that stems from having the power to make decisions.  This allows for more decisions to be made 
by First Nations bands and less by non-First Nations governments.  The more self-determination 
that is created, the more empowered a band will be.  This is like creating a foundation based on 
reading – if you give someone the basic skills to read, the reader will eventually be able to figure 
out the larger words on their own with practice – it is a snowball effect.  With respect to bands, 
there must be community confidence and legitimacy of leadership for this to work.  These values 
can be maintained with a strong cultural match in business and in governance, providing a strong 
foundation for self-determination. 
3.6 The ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ Approach 
Self-determination and some aspects of self-government have been realized through TLE 
in Saskatchewan, and the First Nations taxation system that was created is evidence of this, as 
exercised by such bands as MLCN.  MLCN demonstrates already achieved levels of self-
determination in the decision-making capacity involved in handling their TLE settlement.  
Confidence with the organization of the TLE economic development strategy is what is needed to 
secure confidence for the development of self-government, or some level of governance 
autonomy.  Outright and serious discussions of such issues were not formalized until the 1990s in 
Saskatchewan after the signing of the TLEFA.  According to David Hawkes, a ‘Made in 
Saskatchewan’ process was designed to sort out jurisdictional issues – the exclusive decision-
making abilities of various levels in governments.  This impacts on First Nations good 
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governance.  There are two complimentary processes involved in the ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ 
approach: (1) the Exploratory Treaty Table; and (2) the Common Table.  It is through these two 
tables that all parties involved are able to communicate ideas. 
 The Exploratory Table, as explained by Hawkes, is a bilateral process between the 
Canadian federal government and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN).  The 
FSIN represents seventy-four First Nations bands in the province.  The purpose of the 
exploratory table is to discuss the historic Treaties, as both parties interpret the Treaties 
differently.  The province of Saskatchewan is not involved directly, but is allowed to participate 
as an observer.62  This process came about after the TLEFA as it was mandated in 1995.63  The 
Office of the Treaty Commissioner (OTC), a position that was created in 1989,64 and renewed in 
1996 by the FSIN, oversees this process and enables “an impartial and effective forum for 
advancing Treaty discussions.”65  This table functions as a means for settling on a common 
understanding between parties regarding the interpretation of the Treaties and how jurisdiction 
can be divided and shared regarding such matters as: child welfare, education, shelter, health, 
justice, Treaty annuities, hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering, and lands and resources.66  The 
objective of this process is to discuss the intentions of the parties involved and enable the 
relationships between the parties to grow as each side begins to understand the other and their 
positions.67  The objective was working in some respects, as the Exploratory Treaty Table has led 
up to the published works, “Statement of Treaty Issues: Treaties as a Bridge to the Future” in 
1998.  This explained the common understandings found in the Treaty relationship.  These works 
were validated through the endorsement of the publication by both DIAND and FSIN.68 
 The Common Table process is the second aspect of the ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach 
to Treaties and First Nations governance.  The process began in 1996 as part of a protocol 
agreement signed between the government of Canada, the province of Saskatchewan and the 
FSIN.  It was designed “to facilitate effective processes for negotiating and implementing First 
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Nations governance in Saskatchewan, building on the existing Treaty relationship.”69  The 
Common Table pays particular attention to self-government.  Its primary function is to “negotiate 
and implement self-government arrangements and discuss treaty issues when they affect all three 
parties.”70  This demonstrates that there is room for several levels of self-determination, and a 
desire by all parties for First Nations to break dependency from the Crown. 
 There are two other functions, or subgroups of the Common Table. One is the Fiscal 
Relations Table, which was established under the Common Table in 1997, and the other is the 
Governance Table that was established in 1998.71  Working groups included areas of education, 
family, and child services.  The working groups under the two sub-tables have since 
amalgamated (in 2002) to create a single table under the Common Treaty Table process.72   
In 2000, the Framework Agreement on Governance and Fiscal Relations’ was signed.  It 
is used as a mechanism to develop “effective and efficient governance structures that will allow 
for a legitimate, accountable, transparent, and culturally appropriate exercise of governance by 
First Nations that builds on the Treaty relationship between Saskatchewan First Nations and 
Canada.”73  The Agreement’s other purpose is “to develop a new fiscal relationship and 
appropriate funding mechanisms in support of First Nations governance,” as well as identifying 
principles that are essential in the development of ‘agreeable’ inter-governmental relationships.74  
The existence of these agreements reinforces all parties’ desires for First Nations bands to 
become more self-sufficient and less dependent on the government. 
 These tables, common and exploratory, have led to further developments of self-
determination and self-government.  The signed agreement addressed issues such as jurisdiction 
and authority, and how that reflects “their values, traditions, and cultures, and the facilitation of a 
smooth transition from the Indian Act to a new system of governance by First Nations in 
Saskatchewan.”75  The development of this agreement led to both a bilateral and trilateral 
‘Agreement in Principle’, which were agreed upon on July 17, 2003.76  The process that 
contributed to TLE and the TLEFA was the Specific Claims Process and the Office of the Treaty 
                                                
69  Hawkes, 124.   
70  Hawkes, 124.   
71  Hawkes, 124.   
72  Hawkes, 124.   
73  Hawkes, 124.   
74  Hawkes, 124.   
75  Hawkes, 124-125.   
76  Hawkes, 125.   
 56 
Commission.  The process has also provided viable options for economic development, helping 
to break dependency.  This combination of the TLEFA and economic development, and the OTC, 
has led to many discussions and continued development in self-governance.  The Agreement in 
Principle, with particular regard to mandates about phasing out the Indian Act and solving 
jurisdictional issues, represent proof that positive actions are being taken to sever non-First 
Nations governmental control of First Nations governments.  
 The ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach for First Nations governance had to be developed 
as a province-wide system, as it was an offshoot development from another province-wide 
settlement formula – the TLEFA.  Another reason this approach developed as a province-wide 
system is because of the province-wide structure of the parties involved in the negotiations (i.e. 
the FSIN).  It was a mass negotiation with First Nations bands instead of a band-by-band basis.  
The system provides the formula for establishing jurisdictional boundaries, and bands are able to 
apply their cultural thumbprint to their governance mechanism.  The system is allowing First 
Nations governments to develop in more than seventy communities with more than 115,000 
people.77  Under FSIN, Saskatchewan bands are organized into Tribal Councils and these 
councils function within the established Treaty areas in the province.  This is not that different 
than the way the Agreement in Principle outlines the manner First Nations governance will be 
operating as a whole; this is another reason as to why the province-wide principle of organization 
is sought.  What is proposed in the agreement is that there would be “a single province wide 
government, a series of about five regional governments (based on tribal areas or Treaty areas), 
and more than seventy community First Nations governments.”78  Although this is a province-
wide system, there is room for bands to involve expression of culture, which allows for 
legitimacy. 
 An expression of culture can be negotiated into First Nations band governance because 
even with a province-wide formula and agreement, there is room for sensitive areas, such as 
family services.  To carry out the Agreement in Principle, each community enters into it giving 
consent to a province-wide First Nations government (i.e. FSIN) to control law-making powers, 
creating one law for all First Nations in Saskatchewan.  It is believed that, “in addition to 
achieving economies of scale, this would dramatically increase the possibility of meaningful, 
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effective and efficient governance.”79  Hawkes expresses that this form of governance is 
necessary to harmonize First Nations laws with provincial and federal laws.  By having every 
band follow under one province-wide system, laws would be less complicated to harmonize than 
it would be with all the individual bands.80  The author also believes that “aggregating 
jurisdiction should also make it easier for First Nations to organize a professional public service 
and develop sound intergovernmental relations with the governments of Canada and 
Saskatchewan.”81  There are flaws in the governance system developed in the ‘Made in 
Saskatchewan’ approach.  One particular flaw that requires mentioning is that the individual 
voices of bands may be lost and their culture minimalized.  Questions that should be asked are: 
Are there protections to prevent this from happening?  What happens to the bands that have 
already negotiated these laws in their TLEFA settlements – does one supersede the other? 
 The ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach is pertinent to this discussion because it 
demonstrates advancements in relationships and agreements as a result of the TLEFA and 
corresponding relationships.  Successful bands, such as MLCN, have demonstrated sound 
decision-making with their handling of their TLE settlements and consequently validated 
leadership and levels of self-determination being experienced.  This develops a confidence in the 
area of self-government for bands that are proven ready.  The TLE land claims settlement process 
provided bands with decision-making capacity and some level of self-determination.  With 
success and good practices, confidence develops, providing the proof needed that a band is ready 
for more autonomy and self-determination, which can be achieved through forms of self-
government.  This process makes the ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach the next logical step for 
bands to break dependency with the Crown. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Although MLCN was not the first urban reserve in Canada, as previously mentioned, it 
was the first urban reserve created with specific economic development objectives.  It is for this 
reason that MLCN is a good model for study of TLE-based economic development and self-
sufficiency.  Also, the band recently celebrated Asimakaniseekan Askiy’s twentieth anniversary 
(the urban reserve in Sutherland), providing enough time to examine how the band has 
implemented the TLE settlement for MLCN.  Every government and every business will have 
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problems along the way, but by all intents and purposes, MLCN is deemed as being economically 
successful by themselves and by outsiders.  In all likelihood, the success of MLCN is a result of 
employing and integrating all four economic strategies that the Harvard Project outlines.  In 
respect to the first strategy, there is still at this time the continuation of financial contributions 
from the federal government while the MLCN retains most of the decision-making power.  The 
second business strategy of the Harvard Project is represented by the business management of the 
community through corporations like Aspen Developments.  This strategy enables the separation 
of business from politics within the band.  The third strategy promotes privately owned 
businesses by band members; MLCN band members have been successful in starting their own 
businesses, as evidenced by Scoles Fine Arts and Framing.  Lastly, MLCN engages in joint 
ventures such as the Dakota Dunes Golf Course.  It is not only because the band integrates the 
four economic strategies from the Harvard Project that MLCN is successful, but also because 
other crucial economical elements are present.   
There is confidence in the economic development of MLCN because there are strong 
cultural matches with business development and the governance structure.  When the culture of 
the people is reflected in governance and business, people can have a sense of pride as they see 
their worldview in the practices of governance and their community’s business.  The success 
MLCN has found in business, as a result of TLE dollars, has enabled the community to develop 
economic self-sufficiency.  This has helped to break dependency with the federal government.  
Since the development of the TLEFA, more bands are discovering a sense of freedom in 
economic success, self-government and self-determination.  All these topics have received a great 
deal of attention, allowing strategies such as the “Made in Saskatchewan” approach to develop.  
There will still be growing pains as self-determination and self-sufficiency progress through TLE 
and the ‘Made in Saskatchewan Approach’, however the ideas for breaking dependency continue 
to evolve.  The strategies being developed still need work, but any flaws are steadily replaced and 
reinforced by innovative ideas and new management systems.  The move towards self-
determination and breaking dependency from the non-First Nations government will continue to 
gain momentum as the needs of First Nations peoples continue to be identified and relationships 
continue to grow.  Since MLCN was the first band to have an urban reserve created with the 
intent of economic development, its grand success can be used as an inspirational springboard for 
TLE urban reserves in other municipalities and provinces across Canada.
 59 
Chapter 4  
BEHIND THE MASK: INTERVIEWS FROM INSIDE THE TREATY LAND 
ENTITLEMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The discussion surrounding outstanding First Nations land claims in Saskatchewan began 
in the 1970s, and it was a result of these initial discussions that years of negotiation and debate 
ensued and culminated in the Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (TLEFA).  Some 
of the people involved in developing the TLEFA were available for interviews for this thesis, 
which helped fill some of the gaps in the academic research.  With the interviews that were 
conducted in combination with Roy Romanow’s archival materials, information was available to 
conduct research in the area of the Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) and the TLEFA.  Once the 
Romanow Papers from Mr. Romanow’s time as Premier are available, the TLE picture will 
broaden once again and new research should be undertaken.  This primary research will not only 
serve as a start to further TLE research in Saskatchewan, but also serves as a learning experience 
for First Nations and governments as new settlements take place. 
This chapter focuses on what some of the major players involved in the development 
process of treaty land entitlement in Saskatchewan in the 1980s and 1990s had to say about the 
Agreement now that it has been in place for more than fifteen years.  The 1980s began to see 
settlements, however most settlements did not happen until the 1990s, after the signing of the 
TLEFA.  People involved in the process were interviewed for their perspective and reflection of 
the agreement now that considerable time has passed.  The people involved in the interview 
process were: Roy Romanow, the former Premier of Saskatchewan; Bill McKnight, former 
Indian Affairs Minister for the federal government and now Treaty Commissioner for 
Saskatchewan; Roland Crowe, Chief of FSIN when the TLEFA was signed; and Harry Lafond, 
former Chief of Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN).  Mr. Lafond was the Chief that signed the 
TLEFA on behalf of his band.  He is now a director at the Treaty Commission in Saskatchewan 
and is working with Bill McKnight.  The interviewees helped develop and implement the TLE 
process in Saskatchewan.  They were asked about whether or not the TLEFA and its’ 
development process had met their expectations.  The purpose of the interviews was to gain 
perspective from various areas of government, and a better understanding through personal 
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reflections.  This is being discussed in relation to the political attitudes at the time of the 
TLEFA’s development and signing.   
When looking through the archival materials and conducting the interviews, several 
themes emerged with respect to the development of the TLEFA and its process.  The archival 
materials were able to illuminate the background and foundation for the TLEFA process; 
moreover, they provided a place to start the interviews.  It was discovered through the interviews 
that there are problems with the TLE process that can be seen now that the TLEFA has been 
implemented, problems such as lack of plan for implementation, breakdowns in communication, 
and administrative or bureaucratic delays.  What makes the Agreement unlike typical government 
programming for First Nations is that this not a funded program delivering services, the TLEFA 
is a settlement agreement that had to be negotiated between parties.  Common threads of criticism 
were identified between both public government and First Nations government officials.   
To round off the discussion, the interviewees were asked about their perspective of the attitudes 
and responses of the people of Saskatchewan towards the TLEFA.  In this area the responses 
were mixed, which was evidence that a shift in attitudes had begun and that the future could be 
perceived as more positive through continued education on the subject.  Settlement agreements 
are tripartite, in that the federal, provincial, and First Nations governments involved must agree 
to reach a settlement.  Provincial governments are further divided into municipalities, making the 
agreement process that much more challenging.  Tripartite agreements can be arranged more 
smoothly if certain measures and protocols are put in place to guarantee co-operation on all sides. 
4.2 Background 
The discussion surrounding TLE was initiated in the 1970’s, and took place over several 
decades.  Former Premier Roy Romanow saw the introduction of TLE discussion of settlements 
during his time as Attorney General of Saskatchewan.  As questions began to develop about the 
outstanding TLE claims in Saskatchewan, correspondence demonstrates how provincial and 
federal officials immediately started looking for effective ways to address those questions.  The 
First Nations land settlements in Saskatchewan came into question when Romanow was serving 
as Saskatchewan’s Attorney General and while Jean Chretien was the minister of Indian Affairs 
in P.E. Trudeau’s Liberal government.  Initially the federal government was only willing to deal 
with land claims of those who had not yet entered into Treaty.  In 1973, K. Lysyk (Deputy 
Attorney General) sent a letter to Romanow outlining the federal government’s position stating 
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“the federal government is prepared to enter into negotiations in order to settle the claims of those 
Indians who have not signed treaties with the government.”1  Evidently this position of the 
federal government has changed as TLE developments continued throughout the decade.  Proof is 
demonstrated in the discussion and development of a Saskatchewan Formula and the advent of 
the TLEFA. 
In 1976, the provincial government made a commitment to settle outstanding claims with 
David Ahenakew, who then was the Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians - FSI (Now 
FSIN – Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations).  In all likelihood, the commitment to settle 
happened at this time because of the attention garnered from the national First Nations 
organization and to court decisions, such as the Calder decision.2  Ted Bowerman (M.L.A 
Department of Northern Saskatchewan) wrote Chief Ahenakew on behalf of the provincial 
government stating that “the Province is prepared to negotiate with the Federation of 
Saskatchewan Indians and Canada on settlement of outstanding Treaty Indian land claims based 
on the Treaties, 1930 commitments in ‘The Natural Resources Transfer Agreement’ and using the 
FSI formula.”3  The negotiations covered issues such as the formula for settlement, government 
responsibilities, and the settlement of third party interests.  These negotiations continued 
throughout the early 1970s and reached their climax at the birth of the TLEFA in September of 
1992.     
It is not until agreements are put in place that the deficiencies in such agreements become 
visible.  The shortcomings in the TLEFA can now be observed and rectified as similar 
agreements develop in other jurisdictions, including Saskatchewan.  Bill McKnight briefly 
pointed to the process occurring in Manitoba, but explained that it is barely existent.  Provinces 
that are carrying out the first stages of agreement implementation will be able to learn from the 
growing pains of the process in Saskatchewan.  This knowledge based on experiences of others 
should make for a smoother process in the future because obstacles that the Saskatchewan 
                                                
1  R900, V 159 g 1/9, Indian and Métis General, Dept. Memo, Government of the Province of Saskatchewan, 
from K. Lysyk, to The Honourable Roy J. Romanow Qc, Att. General, re: Claims of Indian and Inuit People 
(November 1, 1973).   
2  Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; David A. Cruickshank, “Calder Case,” 
in The Canadian Encyclopedia, Institute Historica Dominion Institute, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0001169 (accessed June 30, 
2010; David W. Elliot, Canadian Legal Studies Series – Law and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 5th edition 
(Concord, ON: Captus Press, 2005): 44-46.  
3   R900, V 159 e 3/12, FSI: General, Minister of the Dept. of Northern Saskatchewan, from Ted Bowerman, 
to Chief Ahenakew, re: Unfulfilled Treaty Indian Land Claims (August 23, 1976).   
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experience has encountered can be more easily planned for and removed. 
4.3 No Contingency Plans for Implementation 
Of the primary themes that emerged from interviewing people involved with the TLEFA 
and the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation (MLCN) settlement, it was found that there was no real 
process in place in the beginning for the implementation of the TLEFA.  There is one important 
difference between MLCN and the other entitlement bands, and that is the way in which their 
settlement occurred.  The other entitlement bands followed the settlement formula set out in the 
TLEFA signed in 1992, but MLCN followed an older formula for the settlement of its urban 
reserve in Saskatoon some years prior to the signing.  What connects MLCN to this research is 
that the band is a signatory to the TLEFA as an entitlement band, but they have one of the oldest 
TLE settlements in Canada.  As explained by Bill McKnight, when MLCN began their settlement 
process there was no brochure or document on how the settlement process was going to operate; 
it was only just a theory.4  There was nothing outlining how governments were supposed to 
interact with each other; there was only a general guideline that they were to work 
collaboratively.5  The infrastructure had yet to be developed.  Understanding this, one of the 
contributing parties should have planned for or acknowledged a plan for implementation. 
When discussing the development of the TLEFA with Roland Crowe, the former Chief of 
FSIN, he noted that there should have been a twelve-year plan for the implementation of the 
TLEFA and reserve creation.6  The idea of the twelve-year plan would have provided “ample 
(time) to have land acquisition in place, and business to be started, and reserve creation.”7  He 
explained that from start to finish, twelve years should have been enough time to acquire land 
and have it converted to reserve status.  In other words, any band should see financial returns 
twelve years from the beginning of its TLE settlement process.  The land selection and purchase 
does not take a lot of time.  What is time-consuming is the conversion of land from fee-simple to 
reserve status.  It is time consuming because there is a bureaucratic process that must take place 
before the land is approved for reserve status.  The Auditor General of Canada has found in the 
area of Treaty Land Entitlement obligations, that in both Saskatchewan and Manitoba, there is 
limited progress in the conversion of lands to reserve status.  Since the first examination, the 
                                                
4  Bill McKnight, 2009, interviewed by Rebecca Major (Saskatoon, SK, March 23, 2009).   
5  Bill McKnight, 2009. 
6 Roland Crowe, 2009, interviewed by Rebecca Major (Saskatoon, SK, March 2, 2009). 
7 Roland Crowe. 
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auditor general has found that both provinces have picked up the pace of progress and made a 
concerted effort to work more closely with First Nations.8  There is a specific procedure in place 
for converting land to reserve status, however, by inspection of the Auditor General of Canada, it 
is a process that is slower than necessary.  Upon inspection and critique, the branches of 
government have started to work to shorten the process.  Had any of the parties pushed for a plan 
of implementation, the time delays found by the auditor general would not have happened.  The 
time delays prove unnecessary being as once investigated, both provinces picked up the pace. 
Mr. Crowe discussed lack of capacity on a large scale.  He believed that there should have 
been measures or safeguards put in place for land purchasing.  He believes that if an 
implementation plan were put in place, the land value would not have greatly affected the size of 
settlements for First Nations bands in Saskatchewan.  Purchase values with a variety of options 
could have been provided, i.e.: cost of lands with improvements, so that better informed decisions 
about land selection could have been possible.  From this point of view, it is clear that measures 
should have been put in place to ensure that settlement could happen in a timely fashion.  This 
structure would then allow for quicker access to development for First Nations bands because 
they would not have to wait so long for the land settlement and reserve conversion to be pushed 
through the bureaucracy.  If settlement happened in a timely fashion, bands would not have to 
wait as long to become more self-determining economically or for a break in dependency with 
the Crown. 
The TLEFA was designed as a framework document but it did not offer much in the way 
of operating instructions.  Mr. Lafond explained that it was the band that was made to hire and 
pay for the experts to walk them through the TLEFA process.  Mr. Lafond’s observation is that 
many bands have found the process of finding and hiring experts to be quite challenging, as 
everyone in the initial settlements was new to the operation of the TLE settlements and to the 
TLEFA itself.9  The TLEFA affirms that TLE settlements were to occur in Saskatchewan, and 
that there were certain responsibilities involved, but the Agreement had not detailed the way in 
which people should go about fulfilling their responsibilities.  For example, Article 16.01 of the 
TLEFA explains that responsibilities are to be honoured according to the obligations of the 
                                                
8  Sheila Fraser, FCA, “Message from the Auditor General of Canada – Status Report 2009,” in 2009 March 
Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200903_00_e_32287.html, Auditor General of Canada: Ottawa, Canada 
(accessed July 10, 2010). 
9  Harry Lafond, 2009, interviewed by Rebecca Major (Saskatoon, SK, March 23, 2009).  
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Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA).  The NRTA transferred subsurface rights from 
the federal government to the provincial government.  This brings the Saskatchewan government 
to the TLE table, and impacts the way selection in some mineral-rich areas are handled.  This 
means that what is designed in the TLEFA for settling TLE with Saskatchewan bands cannot 
violate or override the NRTA.  There are no real operation templates for how the TLEFA is 
supposed to function; the framework only exists as a means for bands to settle outstanding 
claims; however, there are provisions in the TLEFA regarding matters of dispute.  It is explained 
in Section 17 that issues of dispute should go to arbitration, but there are no specifics as to how 
handle the issue.10  It appears that the TLEFA was a plan for settlement in the way of intent, more 
than a specific plan or procedure for how to settle outstanding claims. 
The federal government also had obstacles to overcome in the TLE settlement process and 
operation of the TLEFA.  For example, they had to hire and train staff to deal with the new and 
complicated matter of settling TLE.  Mr. Lafond explained that the non-First Nations 
governments were not prepared to facilitate the TLE settlement process as they too “had to staff-
up, they had to train, and all that takes time.  We’re talking months and even years before they 
were up to speed on taking the extra volume of work that was involved in land purchasing and 
assessing the land, etc.”11  In the beginning, the TLE settlement process was incredibly slow as 
all parties learned their roles and responsibilities to the process.  It was not only the First Nations 
that had to train and learn the process without a plan for implementation.  It would have been 
more cost effective for all parties involved to have a plan for implementation drawn up. 
Mr. Lafond’s observations came from his extensive experience in the process as he was 
the First Nations leader of MLCN during the TLEFA process and is now Executive Director of 
the Office of the Treaty Commissioner (OTC).  Bill McKnight and Roy Romanow also provided 
some insight into obstacles in the process from the non-First Nations government perspective.  
Bill McKnight observed that the way TLE proceeded was very paternalistic and explains, 
“Officials who have been given a job to do, try and do that job.  They don’t worry about how 
long it takes, or how long it takes to get return on First Nation investments and land, they’re 
going to do their job.”12  McKnight describes the stance taken by government was akin to that of 
                                                
10  Government of Canada, Saskatchewan Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (September 1992): 
108-111. 
11  Harry Lafond. 
12  Bill McKnight. 
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a parent taking care of a child.  The government also had problems playing both the parent and 
the opposite negotiating party when no one was sure what the process for settlement was and how 
to effectively change roles.  This created obstacles for the First Nations governments, especially 
with respect to the amount to time it took to reach a settlement and finish the settlement process, 
as it was the best interests of the non-First Nations governments that were being safeguarded as 
the end result.  The federal government will take the time they need to ensure that the deal being 
reached is the best deal for them. 
Roy Romanow pointed out that a similar situation was occurring with the provincial 
government during the negotiation and execution of the TLEFA.  The interests of the government 
were much different than First Nations.  The government’s interests ignored the fact that most 
First Nations were not well equipped to implement TLE settlements, as the government was also 
in the midst of learning the procedures.  Romanow states that he had to balance the interests of 
the province, First Nations and the federal government with his own personal views.  This task 
proved challenging for him.  Romanow explained this by saying that his:  
Own personal disposition would be very much to side with the constructionist, traditional, 
original concept of Treaty as Chief Crowe and others have advocated, but when you wear 
a Premier’s hat, and you’ve got Ottawa at the table as well, because this involves never 
violating the principle that the Treaty obligation is between the Crown and the 
government representing the Crown, federal government, it makes it a little more 
difficult.13   
 
Romanow was not able to promote his personal views of TLE, but instead had to work within the 
legal scope that the people of the Saskatchewan and the government were willing to accept.  
Romanow himself was not in any major opposition with the First Nations’ interpretation of TLE; 
however, he could not express his personal views when dealing with TLE during his time in 
office – this is because it was not in the interest of the province.  Using the official stance of the 
government body, wanting the narrowest settlement possible, slowed down TLE settlements and 
the negotiation of the TLEFA.  Governments will look out for themselves first in terms of 
settlement, which that in itself takes time.  The non-First Nations governments do not feel the 
same urgency as First Nations bands for settlements as they are in a position of defendant against 
a claimant.  Lawyers and government experts are needed and have to be trained to examine all 
angles of settlements to ensure that governments are meeting only the minimum requirements for 
                                                
13  Roy Romanow, 2009, interviewed by Rebecca Major (Saskatoon, SK, March 5, 2009). 
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settlement within its obligations in the framework agreement.  The federal and provincial 
governments experienced their own growing pains from which they are still learning and 
recovering.  All sides had to build capacity, or in other words, they had to work from within the 
structure of the TLEFA and with other bodies also working to learn that structure when 
implementing TLE settlements, all the while, attempting to protect the interests of the parties they 
represented.  The capacity building for the settlement process was necessary but time consuming 
and was an obstacle in and of itself for finalizing the TLEFA and reaching settlement agreements. 
4.3.1 Capacity-Building 
There should have been an arrangement or an ingredient for capacity-building in the 
institutional structuring of the TLEFA.  Mr. Lafond explained that capacity-building was not part 
of the TLE process and that “bands had to find money to do that, granted the federal government 
made some programs available, but it wasn’t until after the fact.”14  The initial TLE bands paved 
the way in organizing the TLE settlement skeleton by developing the structural formula that was 
needed to settle the claims resulting from the TLE.  Without any real guide, these bands had to 
create the structure for settlement of outstanding claims and hire and train staff to work within the 
settlement process.  The problem was that the government had only developed a plan for 
implementation in the middle of this process.  Harry Lafond explains that “you had instances 
where bands were buying land that was of limited value and really didn’t fit their economic plan 
and social plan, and mistakes like that cost money and then what do you do with that land?”15  It 
was a case of the blind leading the blind in the initial stages, before the settlements became 
common practice in the province.  Mr. Lafond’s complaint about land purchases was along the 
same lines as what Mr. Crowe was saying about a need for a land-purchasing safeguard. 
This was a new process for all parties involved, and many bands were taking risks as they 
developed their economic plan and chose land.  There should have been a game plan in place for 
development from the land settlements so that bands could have ideas as to how to select land 
that would fit their development and economic needs.  It appears that more than one band 
incurred problems with selecting land and a business strategy to develop assets gained after 
settlement.  There are now bands that could be looked to as the model for success with land 
entitlements and economic development.  As well, there are strategies spelled out, such as 
                                                
14  Harry Lafond. 
15  Harry Lafond. 
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strategies found in the Harvard Project from which bands can choose – making land selection 
easier and understanding how certain strategies can facilitate success in economic development. 
While discussing the lack of settlement infrastructure in place, Mr. Lafond referred to 
barriers for the First Nations bands.  “Just when you thought you were breaking free, or you were 
overcoming a barrier, you’d find another barrier just waiting for you.”16  The TLEFA gave rise to 
communication barriers, negotiation barriers, land selection barriers, and general barriers related 
to capacity-building.  By looking at the process in this manner, one can assume that it was a very 
frustrating learning experience.   
Barriers can be discouraging at the best of times; it would seem even more difficult when 
there are onlookers of a new political experiment.  The TLEFA was a political experiment 
because the Agreement was the first of its kind in Canada.  It was a new method for settling 
Specific Claims and it involved a new organization of tripartite governance relationships, which 
necessitated interaction and cooperation with municipalities.  Other jurisdictions in Canada that 
embark on settling outstanding land agreements with First Nations can be made aware of the 
problems that can arise from lack of infrastructure and compensate for that in their own 
settlement process.  Mr. McKnight carried this discussion further in supporting Mr. Lafond by 
explaining that he also saw a deficiency in the process with the lack of infrastructure to 
implement the TLEFA.  Despite this, he explained that Saskatchewan is the leading example for 
the process up to this point because the other example, Manitoba, is so terrible.17  It is generally 
accepted that Manitoba has made very little progress in land settlements in the way of TLE up to 
this point, as observed by Mr. McKnight.  
The issue of the lack of infrastructure for the implementation of the TLEFA directly 
correlates with the other two primary themes that emerged from the interview process – the 
problems of breakdowns in communication and of bureaucracy.  Mr. Lafond related the issues of 
lack of infrastructure to the length the settlement process has taken.  The process was long 
because of bureaucratic delays and the length of time needed to hire and train new employees to 
work through the settlements – the lack of contingency plan for the implementation of the 
TLEFA.  When asked about the deficiencies, Mr. Lafond explained that the waiting times were 
extremely problematic.  For MLCN, it took fifteen years for them to start development on a 
                                                
16  Harry Lafond. 
17  Bill McKnight. 
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property that was selected.18  The band had to wait for the finalization of land before they could 
begin development.  Fifteen years is a long time to wait for development to start, which is why 
Roland Crowe wanted to see a twelve-year Treaty implementation plan.  Mr. Crowe expected 
that twelve years would be enough time, which makes fifteen years quite excessive.  It is clear 
that the lack of planning for implementation caused avoidable time delays in the settlement 
process. 
4.4 Breakdowns in Communication 
For the TLEFA to function, the relationships must not only be developed, but there must 
be effective communication.  When interviewing Mr. Romanow, he mentioned that there must be 
political will for the TLEFA to function properly and for claims to get settled.19  But what 
happens when there is no political will?  The answer is that the settlement process can get held up 
for years, as has been the case for many bands that have experienced time delays.  In discussion 
of the TLEFA development, Mr. Romanow explains that “Ottawa was a mystery, sometimes it 
would not be engaged, and sometimes it would be very engaged, both ways: (a) with the 
provincial government at the expense of the First Nations governments, or (b) to its suiting with 
the First Nations governments.”20  With this type of back and forth movement in negotiations, the 
bureaucracy – or layers of government administration – can slow down the process and create 
voids in communication.  This is why there should be measures put in place so that the 
communication remains consistent.  If it were stipulated in the TLEFA that meetings must 
happen in a timely fashion, a smoother negotiation process would occur.  For instance, a 
provision stating that no more than three months can pass without proper consultation or 
meetings may have been appropriate.  The TLEFA should clearly spell out what qualifies as 
proper modes of communication.  Measures would be as simple as having templates in place 
informing bands of the economic goals and options that are available to them through certain 
land purchases. 
These issues of engagement affected the speed at which settlements occurred.  Mr. 
Romanow explained that some of the difficulties that related to communication breakdowns 
involved the debates surrounding “the place of Treaties in our Constitutional, social, economic 
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and legal framework.”21  One of the problems with tripartite agreements, according to Mr. 
Romanow, is that they are complicated in their very nature.22  Tripartite agreements take time, as 
all sides have their own agenda, and they have to work together to create an agreement that is 
amenable to everyone involved.  Delays in agreements can occur because of issues such as 
responsibility interpretation.   
With respect to TLE, all governments involved had the obstacle of trying to agree upon 
the meaning and intent of the Treaties.  This is important as it directly relates to the jurisdictional 
responsibilities within levels of government.  The political issues that were debated often caused 
delays and obstacles to the process.  For example, with the case in Saskatchewan, Mr. Romanow 
says:  
In my time, there would be a greater statement of Treaty Entitlements and what Treaty 
means, primarily from First Nations negotiators, which frequently would be interpreted 
by Ottawa and provincial government negotiators as being excessive or inaccurate, or to 
put in simple, pragmatic terms, unrealistic with respect to the amount of land that should 
be actually transferred to meet the obligation of the Treaty.23  
 
 Mr. Romanow explained that there remains a breakdown in understanding the intent of the 
Treaties, and that this is yet to be truly resolved.24  This comment arose when asked about 
deficiencies in the TLEFA process.  The government often embraces a limited view of Treaties, 
releasing itself from as much responsibility as possible.  The bureaucratic layers of government 
and political positions can cause obstacles, time delays or roadblocks; unfortunately, there are no 
answers on how to deal with this in the way of developing an infrastructure.  It is interesting that 
when the auditor general developed a progress report that the speed of the settlement process 
increased. 
Mr. McKnight was asked if he felt that the TLEFA process was a success, and he too 
pointed to problems with communication.  His response to the question was that initially it had 
met his expectations, however, as time passed, he realized that there were communication 
problems and breakdowns in understandings.25  He said “as I become more familiar with today’s 
history of TLE, where there seems to be a breaking down of communication in between the 
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province and the First Nations who are entitled to TLE.”26  Acknowledging this proves that 
implementation plans for communication would have made for a more timely process.  As Mr. 
McKnight is now Treaty Commissioner in Saskatchewan, he is able to see another side to the 
process of the TLE.  He is now in a key position to watch all of the parties interact, and determine 
where other problems with the TLEFA exist.   
Mr. Lafond also had a comment on communication as he had encountered problems when 
trying to communicate with all the entitlement bands involved in the TLEFA.  Lack of 
communication was something that Mr. Lafond noted as a barrier to the settlement of the 
TLEFA.  In addition, he mentioned that while governmental bureaucracy might have been 
intended to create avenues for communication, it instead created barriers to communication.27  
The avenues for communication should have been outlined in a plan for implementation, making 
the process more expedient and less dependent on political will, as will be discussed in the 
following section. 
4.5 Administrative/Bureaucratic Delays 
Bureaucratic hold-ups were the most problematic issue for all leaders involved in the 
interviews.  Mr. Lafond saw bureaucracy - or administrative layers of government - as a 
roadblock, explaining that; “some of the existing legislation and policies that existed within the 
federal government, both in Indian Affairs and in the Department of Justice, stood in the way of a 
smoothly functioning process.”28  Administrative layers created a lot of red tape through 
paperwork and process, which developed time delays.  Mr. Lafond also explained that the reason 
the process was able to move forward was because of the relationship building that was 
occurring, such as the relationships between the communities of MLCN, the municipality, and 
provincial and federal levels of government.29  The process for assessing land and creating 
reserves should have been planned and detailed in the TLEFA rather than having the 
governments design the process as they went.  This is something that could have been placed in a 
purchase policy.  Because of this late planning they had to educate the people involved as the 
settlements developed, as discussed previously, and they had to work through the layers of 
government.   
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Mr. Lafond discussed administrative delays further by explaining that he saw the reserve 
creation process as “ too embedded with barriers.”30  He pointed to the fact that the process was 
too tightly tied to the Department of Justice and their legal obstacles, and tied too closely to 
environmental concerns.  These barriers once again point to delays due to the layers of 
government involved, creating administrative entanglements.  One particular instance of this 
administrative delay is shown in MLCN’s settlement with the Sutherland location in Saskatoon.  
After the MLCN chose this land, the federal government first took fifteen years to validate its 
reserve status before it took another ten years for returns to reach the community, making it a 
total of twenty-five years before the community could begin to see returns.31  The lack of 
effective land selections and reserve creation procedures greatly undermined MLCN’s ability to 
develop and implement a sound economic strategy for their land in a timely fashion.  If 
infrastructure were in place for land selection and reserve creation, it would not have taken longer 
than twelve years for this to happen for First Nations bands in Saskatchewan.  The delay was 
because of the lack of process in place and because of the layers of administration that created 
barriers. 
Mr. McKnight explained that some of the delay was due to the paternalism found within 
the bureaucracy.  He said “a lot of [the delays are] happening because of government saying 
‘We’re going to be sure that everything is fine and that there’s nothing wrong with this land.’  
Even though the First Nations had lived beside the land or on it for the last one-hundred and fifty 
years, the government insisted that they were ‘going to make sure it is a good deal for you’.”32  
Mr. McKnight was quite clear in saying that he does not believe that First Nations always need to 
be held by the hand, like a parent leads a child, as that just adds more unnecessary paternalism to 
the process.33  If anything, this paternalistic view towards the First Nations generates more 
indignation than it does comfort.  Instead, what can help smooth out the whole process is having 
infrastructure guidelines for all sides to follow, thus removing the paternalistic approach that 
appears to be solely directed at First Nations.  By having this infrastructure in place, the 
administrative levels of government would not hold the process up because everyone would be 
clearly aware of their role.  This would also remove layers of red tape because the settlement 
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procedure would be developed.  Had the federal government had this anti-paternalistic attitude at 
the time of settlement, the time for land assessment would not have slowed down the process. 
At this point, the settlements process can continue to move forward through the 
relationships that have been created and maintained with all parties involved.  For example, Mr. 
McKnight explains that a continued relationship between the bands and municipalities has been 
essential, and MLCN has been a good example of how those relationships have been 
maintained.34  This is the same strength in relationships that Mr. Lafond acknowledged.  It is 
important to acknowledge this relationship as it stresses how important the lines of 
communication are, and perhaps in the future there needs to be a framework designed to ensure 
less bureaucracy and political delays, allowing for better communication between parties.  
Measures need to be put in place to guarantee on-going communication and engagement. 
Mr. Romanow also discussed how bureaucracy, or administrative levels of government, 
held the process up and that it can be intentional or unintentional as described in his discussion of 
Ottawa.  A problem that Mr. Romanow pointed to was that “the frequency and urgency of 
meetings was often lacking”35 in the development stages of the TLEFA and in settlement 
negotiations.  He explained that in order for the process to move forward, the governments 
involved needed to feel a sense of commitment, which is tied back to political will (a form of 
determination fuelled by a particular incentive).  This was because at the best of times, one had to 
keep pushing their staff to move ahead in the development of the TLEFA.  “What I’m really 
saying is that there has to be a political imperative present in the process.”36  Without this 
commitment, the settlement process can get lost in administration and cause lengthy delays.  This 
perspective is demonstrated with the auditor general report, it created the political will to 
accelerate the process of settlement in Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  In Saskatchewan there was a 
political imperative as First Nations leaders were pushing the agenda. 
Mr. Crowe perceived that the length of time it took to achieve settlement was a result of 
delays caused mostly by non-First Nations governments.  He believed that “The province to some 
degree in those years and today are trying to block large acquisitions of land by First Nations 
people”37 by causing delays and holding up the settlement process as could be perceived by the 
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time that land purchases were taking in the assessment stage.  Mr. Romanow had pointed to the 
back and forth of Ottawa.  In all likelihood, the government delays happened in all branches of 
government, whether intentional or unintentional.  The bureaucratic time delays tie into Mr. 
Crowe’s desire to have a twelve-year plan of implementation.  When there are plans for 
implementation in place, guidelines for continued communication and templates from which to 
work, less administrative delays and time delays can transpire.  These are problems that can be 
resolved with time limits.   
A shortcoming that Mr. Crowe also pointed to is that there should have been better 
acquisition packages made available from the levels of government.  In the selection packages, 
Mr. Crowe believes that there should have been some diversity and not just a preoccupation with 
limited types of resources such as lumber.38  This way, the band would have access to diverse 
economic pools to generate funds from when there are economic problems that arise.  This 
illustrates the fact that governments should have been better prepared to handle the settlement 
process.  MLCN is seen as the example of success in TLE economic development and this is 
attributed to the diversity employed in their business plan.  They use a blend of four economic 
strategies demonstrated in the Harvard Project on Indian Economic Development.  The assembly 
of economic option packages by governments would have given the TLE bands choices in 
accessing various profitable resources that could be developed.  Of course it is easy to see this in 
hindsight, but it is a way that people who are still reaching settlement agreements or frameworks 
can better prepare for the future.  Now that particular errors have been pointed out in 
development strategies, future bands can learn and better prepare for their own economic 
development.  Bands in Saskatchewan are becoming models of success and can be looked upon 
by current settlement bands for ideas in developing their own economic development plan.  
Stronger preparation and implementation strategies are emerging, and economical successes are 
becoming more prevalent.   As Mr. McKnight pointed out, “when there is success economically, 
people now are starting to understand that we all benefit.”39 
4.6 Attitudes and Responses Continue to be Mixed 
The reactions to the TLE process by the people in Saskatchewan continue to be mixed.  
When Mr. Crowe was asked about how the people of Saskatchewan have reacted to TLE and the 
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economic success that has been created by the First Nations peoples, he responded based on his 
personal experience.  He said he was pleasantly surprised by the warm reception he received by 
the communities that were approached for land purchases made through TLE.  Initially, Piapot – 
Mr. Crowe’s band – was one of the first communities to start purchasing land through TLE after 
the TLEFA was signed, and they found people very opposed to the new land purchases.  But as 
time passed, and other non- Native communities were approached, the band began to be 
welcomed.  When a meeting was held in Perry, Saskatchewan, near Piapot First Nation, Mr. 
Crowe was surprised that two of the three reeves stood up and said, “We want to welcome our 
new neighbours.”40  Mr. Crowe explained that this unexpected kindness gave him goose bumps;41 
it marked an impression in his mind that people in Saskatchewan were becoming more accepting 
of the process.  Mr. Crowe believed that this acceptance was due to the people’s gradual 
realization that TLE would have positive economic benefits for them as well as First Nations 
people. 
Mr. Romanow experienced problems with TLE while he was in public office serving as 
the Premier of Saskatchewan.  In 1999, Mr. Romanow encountered resistance to the process 
while on the campaign trail.  He explained that “there were hostile voices directed at me, voices 
which argued that governments were prepared to provide ‘handouts’, or, using my word, 
concessions, to First Nations people, but all the while some of the communities who were non-
First Nations did not similarly receive benefits.”42  He continued by saying that “the anger toward 
the government, to my surprise and a little to my dismay, was often described in the context of 
belief that somehow we had been coddling, promoting First Nations people that have special 
rights the others didn’t have.”43  Mr. Romanow did explain that he does not remember this 
happening in any other election – not even the one that was lost in 1982.  He did note that now 
there seemed to be “openness about the presence of the economic development potential,” and he 
believes that things are changing and the process is gradually being accepted.44  This is not that 
different from what Mr. Crowe was saying about how initially there was opposition, except Mr. 
Romanow found the resistance once settlements had been occurring, rather than in the initial 
stages.  With time, these barriers of opposition are being overcome.  The people of Saskatchewan 
                                                
40  Roland Crowe. 
41  Roland Crowe. 
42  Roy Romanow. 
43  Roy Romanow. 
44  Roy Romanow. 
 75 
are going through a change in attitude, shifting to a more positive outlook of TLE and the far-
reaching economic development that that process fosters. 
Mr. Lafond and Mr. McKnight see this change in attitude across the province in a 
different light.  Mr. Lafond measures the change in attitude in the province by looking at the way 
First Nations business is being handled in the non-First Nations community on a professional 
level.  Harry Lafond refers to this shift in terms of a barometer when describing the way things 
have changed for First Nations since the 1992 TLEFA; there have been institutional changes in 
the business world to accommodate the First Nations situation.  He notes that the banks have 
been open to First Nations bands and have been willing to extend opportunities for economic 
development.  “They went so far as to modify their policies and to up the risk, ‘cause they know 
there is a higher risk where dealing with us because of legislation like the Indian Act.”45  This 
coincidently relates back to the problems surrounding bureaucracy, as it is administration and 
legislation that has made it difficult for First Nations to do business.  Banks have limits on the 
level of risk they are allowed to take on, and traditionally First Nations business development has 
been high risk.  This is because bands did not traditionally have assets at their disposal.  
Economic development for First Nations is accessible now through funds made available from 
TLE.  Bands are making economic development their primary objective when making decisions 
about their settlements for lands owed, thus alleviating the banks’ perception of risk significantly 
and creating the shift in the business world. 
Mr. McKnight explained that there has been an attitude shift in the people of 
Saskatchewan, but that he cannot attribute the shift solely to the implementation of the TLEFA.  
This is not to say that the paternalism embedded in the non-First Nations government has ceased 
to exist, but has eased as time has passed a society has evolved.  Mr. McKnight sees TLE as a 
primary reason for the shift in attitudes towards First Nations and their economic development, 
but the change has also been due to the efforts of First Nations’ leadership and the efforts by non-
First Nations people in the business community.  The shift in attitude has also happened because 
of First Nations leaders and politicians stressing the successes that are happening with First 
Nations business.  This answer is similar to the one Mr. Lafond gave about the changes in 
perceptions held by the business community and the banking industry.46  There has been a 
                                                
45  Harry Lafond. 
46  Harry Lafond. 
 76 
concerted effort by many, including the Office of the Treaty Commissioner, to promote and 
demonstrate the successes that have resulted for First Nations peoples and bands within the 
province.  As a result of this promotion, the Saskatchewan people are able to see the good that is 
coming from TLE and the settlement process, and they have come to accept it and admit the good 
that is being created.47  This goes back to the idea of economic success being beneficial to the 
province in its entirety.  The people of the province are likely to support endeavours that will 
benefit the people of the province economically, creating less of a need or reliance on public 
dollars. 
4.7 Conclusion 
These interviews were conducted to reflect on the TLEFA and its process now that it has 
been functioning for more than fifteen years.  There are certain reasons as to why there are 
problems with the system, but all the problems relate back to the key issue of how time-
consuming the process is.  Although the process has met the expectations of the people 
interviewed for the most part, the interviewees were able to look back and indicate where there 
were problems in the process that need to be addressed.  The reflections also demonstrate a shift 
in attitude by themselves, the people, and the government as bands create successes over the 
years because of TLE settlements. 
It is established that the TLEFA negotiation process, and now the settlement process is 
time consuming because of the lack of contingency planning for the implementation of the TLE 
process, because of breakdowns in communication and understandings, and because of 
administrative hold-ups.  Michel Foucault sees governmentality as “an inescapable fact of social 
life,” all aspects of life is to govern.48  The bureaucracy must be navigated through and 
instruments must be implemented to create space for this settlement process within the apparatus 
of government, as the governance through bureaucracy is inescapable.  All four of the interview 
participants made note of the fact that there needed to be provisions instructing how to implement 
the TLEFA.  Provisions for the infrastructure or a procedural apparatus for First Nations bands 
and governments to follow should have been put in place for negotiations and settlements.  For 
instance, there were no contingency efforts in the TLEFA for how land selection and reserve 
creation was to happen.  It was a learning experience as it was developed.  If guidelines were in 
                                                
47  Harry Lafond. 
48  Barry Smart, Michel Foucault (Taylor & Francis, October 2002): xiv, 
http://lib.mylibrary.com/Browse/open.asp?ID=10957%loc=xiv (accessed June 22, 2010). 
 77 
place, another problem would be alleviated – the problem of breakdowns in communication.  If 
there were communication protocols in existence, communications between different levels of 
government would be less likely to be lost in translation.  If methods of communication were 
mandated, they would become a part of the process that could not be ignored.  These problems 
are directly related to the bureaucratic hold-ups or administrative delays, and political issues that 
were observed by the interviewees.  Mr. Romanow explained how the urgency for TLE-related 
meetings was undermined and Mr. Crowe noted that the bureaucratic hold-ups were at times 
intentional.  There would be few delays in the settlement process and with the communications 
between different levels of government if protocols were mandated and operational guidelines 
were created to carry them out.   
Although there were observable changes in the attitudes from the people of the province 
of Saskatchewan, the changes have been slow.  The problem of time is a key theme emerged that 
out of the problems observed by key players that acted within the settlement process.  Mr. Lafond 
would have liked to have seen quicker results, Mr. Crowe would have liked to have seen time 
limits by having a twelve-year plan and infrastructure, and Mr. McKnight and Mr. Romanow 
would have liked to have seen less paternalism and more political will to speed up the process.  
By accounting for these problems, other governments can have a smoother process and can learn 
from the Saskatchewan model.  Contingency plans should be put in place to reduce the problems 
that can occur in settling outstanding land claims with First Nation bands.  Future settlements will 
be more efficient and expedient, and bands will benefit by acknowledging that new changes and 
developments to the process are necessary to strengthen it.
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Chapter 5  
BREAKING DEPENDENCY IN SASKATCHEWAN 
5.1 Introduction 
The Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (TLEFA) that came about because 
of the need to settle outstanding Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) in Saskatchewan was the first 
agreement of this nature in Canada.  Since the creation of the Office of the Treaty Commissioner 
(OTC) in 1989, and the TLEFA in 1992, other provinces have begun to look to Saskatchewan as 
the example to follow.  The Saskatchewan model would only be considered for a template if it 
were deemed to be a success by the other jurisdictions and by the province itself.  The same can 
be said of Muskeg Lake Cree Nations (MLCN).  MLCN would not be considered a model for 
economic development if they were not successful in their development.  For a province-wide 
settlement model to work, or for the community economic development strategy to be successful, 
there must be confidence from within the system as well as a confidence by outside parties.  
Another important element that must be present is political will.  With confidence and political 
will present, bands can work towards breaking dependency from the Crown through economic 
development. 
 5.2 Findings 
In this research, it was found that for a band to be economically successful – by their 
measure standards and by the measure standards of others – there needs to be many elements at 
work.  To begin, for a settlement agreement or framework to develop, such as the TLEFA, there 
must be political will present from various levels of government.  On the individual band 
settlement level, there must be confidence from the community in the development strategy that 
has been chosen.  The community or band must agree to the settlement offered, and then must 
agree on the development strategy.  Confidence in the development strategy is often a result of 
the strategy reflecting the band’s worldviews.  It is also important that the band have confidence 
in the leaders that are negotiating the settlement and the process for establishing the development 
strategy.  With these elements present in development, a band can work towards economic self-
sufficiency. 
 The research began by asking questions as outlined in chapter one, and by reading the 
available materials on the subject.  It was through this initial research that it became known that 
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more work in the area must be conducted and that this project could help in understanding how 
TLE settlements have been used to create economic development for First Nations in 
Saskatchewan.  Through the chapters that developed from the research came the understanding of 
the TLEFA process and how it has contributed to economic development.  Throughout the 
chapters, TLE and the TLEFA is explained, the economic strategies available for development 
are explored, MLCN is studied to see what has made this particular band successful, and the 
problems with the process are identified.  Other than a more developed understanding of the 
TLEFA, it was discovered that MLCN has been successful in their economic development.  This 
First Nations success is because they used a blended economic strategy that incorporates the 
band’s worldview and has developed internal and external confidences in their economic 
endeavours.   
5.2.1 Chapter One 
The first chapter of this research on TLE and the TLEFA is meant to serve as a contextual 
chapter.  It included some of the background on the TLE process.  The purpose of this is to 
demonstrate where more primary work in the area needs to be done once more archival materials 
become available.  Not all of the Romanow Papers are available through the Provincial Archives 
at this time.  By reviewing the available literature on TLE and the TLEFA, the current gaps in the 
research become evident.  In establishing the foundation for the research, the context is shaped 
and the rationale for conducting the research is explained.  There has been research concluded in 
the area of TLE, the TLEFA, and urban reserves, but the research being conducted here ties the 
agreements to economic development by reviewing development strategy options and examining 
the strategy that MLCN is using.  The intent of the first chapter is to guide and shape the research 
being conducted. 
5.2.2 Chapter Two 
In looking at the development options for First Nations bands, it becomes apparent that 
certain elements must be embedded into strategies for the strategies to work.  The Harvard 
Project demonstrates the economic strategy options First Nations bands have from which to 
choose, but it is expressed in the project that the strategy alone cannot make a band economically 
successful.  For the band to be successful, they need access to resources, strong governance, and 
economic development that fits with their community worldview.  These elements working 
together can solidify the community confidence prescribed for the economic strategy to work.  
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Confidence by the community will not guarantee that economic development will be successful, 
but it can help develop the confidence needed to attract investment and further development.  The 
economic development strategy is to help First Nations become more independent from the 
Crown and outsiders; however, when looking at business investment, attracting outside 
investment helps contribute to economic development and economic expansion. 
The economic development strategies are essential to studying the economic development 
that is taking place in Saskatchewan as a result of the TLEFA because it is through the 
development strategies that bands are creating self-sufficiency.  Bands in Saskatchewan are using 
their financial opportunities found through outstanding land claims and the TLEFA process to 
develop economic opportunities.  The economic strategies available for examination demonstrate 
options and avenues First Nations bands have to create economic development.  For a break of 
dependency to happen through economic development, there needs to be certain measures in 
place.  For instance, there needs to be a strong resource base.  Some bands in Saskatchewan have 
this capability at their disposal because of lands owed to the bands.  This creates access to capital 
in the settlement process and creates a resource base by acquiring lands.  Capital is made 
available to purchase lands and those lands can then be leased to create more capital for 
economic development.  There are roadblocks that First Nations bands have to overcome, one of 
the largest roadblocks being a lack in resources.  Once a band is in a position to overcome the 
roadblocks, paths need to be created and decisions made for a design of operations that will allow 
for a break in dependency from the Crown. 
 The Harvard Project on Indian Economic Development explained that there are four key 
elements involved in economic development: the need to take control, establish institutions, have 
a strategic direction, and have Action Oriented Leaders (AOL).  External opportunity, internal 
assets, and a development strategy are the ingredients that shape a business strategy chosen by a 
First Nations band, and influence the key elements in the Harvard Project.  Some of the external 
factors connect to the elements in breaking dependency.  The factors relate to good governance 
with decision-making powers and the requirement to access financial capital – this is aligned with 
the need to have a strong resource base.  Within the internal assets is the need for there to be a 
strong cultural match with the economic development of First Nations economy.  Finally, the 
development strategy hinges on the idea of the need for a good business plan, which is where the 
Harvard Project’s four strategies come into the picture. 
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 For the four strategies to work successfully for economic development, the strategy must 
compliment the governance structure of the First Nations band implementing development.  
Governance and economic development should operate within the cultural views of the band.  
John Borrows and Sarah Morales discuss economic development for First Nations within the 
context of Canada, and they too stress how important it is that First Nations attempting economic 
development should make sure that the economic strategy they chose to employ fits with the 
band’s culture.  Escaping Crown dependency through economic development is certainly 
possible for First Nations in Saskatchewan and the rest of Canada as long as certain elements are 
present for the community.  There must be a cultural fit with the economic strategy chosen and 
the band’s governing structures.   
 Dwight Dorey is quite explicit as to what has to happen for First Nations economic 
development to be facilitated and successful in Canada.  He explained that it has to be accepted 
that First Nations economic development requires access to resources and control over lands.  
This is something that is occurring in Saskatchewan through TLE.  Mr. Dorey expressed the 
importance of good governance, and that there needs to be transparency and accountability.  
Good governance demonstrates stability and reduces risk in business development.  It is 
understood by Mr. Dorey that all levels of governments should be working together for equitable 
participation in development.  Finally, Mr. Dorey explained how First Nations and non-First 
Nations government should work together for the management of resources.  This is 
operationalized through the duty to consult, which usually occurs in the mining industry in 
Saskatchewan.  However, it may be more applicable to settlements like those seen in the 
Comprehensive Claims in Nunavut and the James Bay of Quebec. 
 A break in dependency from the Crown is possible for First Nations in Saskatchewan as 
long as there is a strong resource base, be it land or financial capital, a good economic plan and 
good governance.  For this to be possible, there must be a strong cultural match between the 
community’s view and the economic strategy chosen and the governance that is in operation.  
One of the largest barriers First Nations bands experience when looking to develop an economy 
is the lack of resources.  Some bands in Saskatchewan are able to overcome this barrier because 
of TLE.  The TLEFA has allowed for economic development, which has made room for a 
progression to self-determination.  Evidence of this is in the decision-making power bands are 
acquiring.  The TLEFA appears to be a strong facilitation for First Nations economic 
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development and that is a good reason as to why other jurisdictions are starting to look at the 
Saskatchewan TLE process.  There are economic options available to bands and certain elements 
that, when made present, can help First Nations economic development become successful. 
5.2.3 Chapter Three 
MLCN is held up as the success strategy for economic development in Saskatchewan, 
which is why the band was used as the case model in chapter three.  The band was able to 
develop economically because of receiving a TLE settlement for lands owed.  MLCN became the 
case model to examine in this process not only because it is the first to work within this process 
in Saskatchewan and had been functioning for the longest period of time, but also because 
academics and public officials hold the band up as the success story from which others can learn.  
Time is a reason for measure as it demonstrates resilience of the economic strategy and is a test 
for whether or not the process is able to function and progress organically.  Although MLCN 
technically settled before the TLEFA, they are still the first TLE band in Saskatchewan to create 
economic development and thus the best band to examine for this study. 
It can be surmised that MLCN has been successful because they blended all four 
strategies for economic development expressed in the Harvard Project.  The Harvard Project’s 
four strategies were federal control, tribal enterprise, private enterprise with a tribal member 
owning the business, and private enterprise with a non-tribal member owning or involved in the 
business.  With respect to federal control, MLCN accepts funds for development and 
advancement from the federal government; however, the federal government no longer has 
absolute decision-making power in all cases, which is why MLCN’s situation falls into an 
adapted version of the federal control strategy.  Also, some of the federal funding projects are 
demonstrating a level of confidence they have in some of the First Nations band economic 
development projects by not interfering in projects that they invest in.  The second strategy is 
demonstrated by the way MLCN uses a corporation to administer the economic development for 
the band, keeping business at arms-length from band politics.  This was a recommendation that 
the Harvard Project made when discussing the use and implementation of this economic strategy.  
MLCN uses the development corporation to facilitate the third business strategy - that of a tribal 
member owning a private business.  The individual takes a loan out from the development 
corporation and then uses that capital to start his or her own business, all the while contributing 
back to the community in interest payments.  The fourth strategy for economic development is 
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also handled under the band’s development corporation, which has allowed for joint ventures 
with other First Nations development corporations.  MLCN has been successful in economic 
development because they have blended all four strategies with their culture and worldview.  
 If economic success were not creating a break in dependency from the Crown, then there 
would not have been specific agreements in place for First Nations governance in Saskatchewan.  
A ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach has been developed to facilitate discussion of First Nations 
governance in Saskatchewan.  In this approach, an Exploratory Table and a Common Table were 
created so all parties could have a venue for discussion.  These types of venues were needed in 
the TLEFA settlement process, but now they can be models for other jurisdictions to immediately 
use when they are trying to establish a similar, but smoother processes.  Although this agreement 
is not quite the same as TLE because TLE is about land settlement instead of governance 
development, it speaks to the process and how the TLE process should be functioning. 
The Exploratory Table is a bilateral arrangement for the federal government and the FSIN 
to have a way to meet and have discussions, which are facilitated by the OTC.  This is a process 
to encourage discussion, a measure that should have been in place for the TLEFA.  It allows for 
the parties at the table to declare intentions or air grievances, and it is a means for parties to come 
to a common understanding.  The common table is a process that involves FSIN, the provincial 
government and the federal government, and this table pays particular attention to the 
development of self-government.  The fact that this is a recognizably large topic of conversation 
demonstrates how the progression of bands becoming economically self-sufficient through TLE 
has led to discussions of self-government.  It is reasonable to see how this road of economic 
development can translate to a breaking of dependency from the Crown, and creating space to 
allow for the path of self-determination and self-government.   
There are flaws in this ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach, which have now been 
accounted for, such as minimalizing individual voices of First Nations, but it is a learning curve 
from which other jurisdictions will benefit.  Problems with the ‘Made in Saskatchewan’ approach 
involved the question of the province-wide formula because there is doubt that there is room for 
culture in all relevant areas.  By having a province-wide system, there are various cultures 
involved in one body, which may make it difficult to have pan-provincial First Nations 
governance when it is not a pan-culture.    
Also, the other major flaw in this approach is that with so many bands under one body, 
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culture may be minimalized and the voices of the individual bands may be lost or go unheard.  
We will continue to learn from flaws found in processes, and there will always be flaws as there 
is no perfect system.  We are definitely on a road of progression, which translates to a break in 
dependency for First Nations initiated through economic development.  Although this ‘Made in 
Saskatchewan’ approach is not part of the TLEFA process, it can be an option for implementation 
in other jurisdictions looking to implement TLE.  It could be the measure needed to continue or 
strengthen the lines of communication. 
5.2.4 Chapter Four 
The interview process that shaped chapter four involved interviewing: Roy Romanow, the 
former Premier and Attorney General of Saskatchewan; Bill McKnight, the former Minister of 
Indian Affairs under Prime Minister Mulroney; Roland Crowe, the former Chief of the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN); and Harry Lafond, the former Chief of 
MLCN.  The interviews addressed the problems with the TLEFA and its process now that time 
has passed since its implementation.  These people were selected for the interviews as they were 
some of the main people involved in the creation of the TLEFA and were aware of the intent of 
the TLEFA and its process.  The interviewees were able to look back and see where problems 
developed, and where there should have been measures put in place to allow for a smoother and 
quicker process.  There were principle themes that emerged from the interview process with these 
individuals.  The themes that emerged identified issues such as; the lack of a plan for the 
implementation of the TLE and the TLEFA process, communication breakdowns, and 
bureaucratic and administrative hold-ups.  These problems are connected to the issue of how time 
consuming the process of settlement can be, which slows down the economic development 
process. 
The lack of effective planning in the way of settlement implementation appears to be a 
problem for the interviewees as it was seen as a reason for the slowness in the TLEFA settlement 
process.  Even though the interviewees complain of too much bureaucracy, the solution to some 
of the problems appears to be the need to implement more bureaucracy or administrative 
procedure in particular areas.  Mr. Roland Crowe explained that there should have been a twelve-
year plan in place for settlement implementation thereby ensuring that there was a guideline to 
follow.  Settlement would have occurred within the twelve years and bands would not have had 
such long waiting periods had there been a template or contingency plan implemented.  Mr. 
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Lafond discussed how they had to develop process and pay for it as they went along.  Mr. 
McKnight also discussed how process had to develop as bands and governments began 
implementing the settlement methodology.  There was no contingency plan built into the TLEFA 
on how to implement the exercise.  Mr. Lafond explained that the procedure had to develop on 
the First Nations governance side and the non-First Nations governance side, which doubly 
slowed the process of settlement implementation.  Mr. Romanow discussed his experience by 
explaining how difficult the process and organization was between the federal and provincial 
governments.  If a plan for implementation had been imbedded in the TLEFA, there would have 
been less confusion in the settlement process and it would have been less time consuming.  By 
politicians and leaders being able to observe the flaws within the system that they helped build, 
other jurisdictions can learn from this and take measures to eliminate the issues to allow for a 
smoother process. 
Although the TLEFA process had bureaucratic problems that caused delays because of 
too much bureaucracy (or too many layers of government administration), there was a common 
thread emerging out of all the delay issues – breakdowns in communication.  Mr. Lafond pointed 
out that there were breakdowns in communication occurring within entitlement bands.  He had 
seen difficulties in coordinating the Saskatchewan First Nations bands involved in the TLEFA 
development process and settlement process.  Mr. Romanow explained that there needed to be a 
political will involved in the process to keep the conversations moving.  He clarified that there 
needed to be a political imperative; politicians have to continue to push their people to keep the 
settlement process moving.  Mr. McKnight agreed that the breakdown in communication was one 
of the major flaws in the entire process.  There needed to be safeguards established to ensure that 
communication continued and did not breakdown or slow the process; however, adding to this 
process is just implementing more bureaucracy.  Bureaucracy is something that is already 
criticized for being too prevalent and intrusive in the process.  That being said, this addition to 
the process appears to be needed as the interviews pointed to a lack of communication as being 
the primary cause of delay. 
The way that the bureaucracy is currently organized within the TLEFA caused delays, and 
some of these delays might have been intentional.  Roland Crowe mentioned how there appeared 
to be intentional blocks involved in the process of land acquisition.  Mr. Romanow had similar 
views in that there had been problems with the government’s political will to continue moving 
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the process along.  It was explained by Mr. Romanow that there was a lack of frequency and 
urgency when it came to the need for meetings to take place for the settlement process to move 
forward.  Mr. Lafond’s role as MLCN chief provided perspective into the band that had 
participated extensively in the process of TLEFA and land claims settlements.  He explained that 
the process was embedded with barriers that slowed settlements down by being tangled up in 
bureaucracy.  Mr. McKnight’s complaint about the bureaucracy was that it was loaded with 
paternalism, like a parent taking care of a child.  Paternalism slowed the process down where the 
federal government would act like a protectionist to the First Nations in land settlement and 
selection.  Bureaucracy appeared to be a problem for the leaders that were interviewed and it was 
tied into the process taking too long. 
The result of the interviews conducted for chapter four was that although there were 
problems with the settlement and implementation of the TLEFA, it was important for a band to 
have access to resources if they wanted to create economic development.  All the interviewees 
discussed that the TLEFA happened because of strong leadership and political will.  The political 
will was present at some point because the TLEFA was developed and implemented.  The strong 
leadership was tied to political will because the leaders had to have the will to develop the 
relationships needed to push the TLEFA and land settlements forward.  Relationship building 
was a necessity to the development of the TLEFA, and it was the political will that drove the 
agenda. 
5.3 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that the TLEFA can work as a model in other jurisdictions looking to 
use a model for settlement of outstanding land claims and economic development.  Now that the 
TLEFA has been implemented for almost two decades in Saskatchewan, it can be observed where 
there are flaws are in the Saskatchewan model.  These flaws can be corrected or have measures 
put in place in other jurisdictions so they do not experience the same problems that arose in 
Saskatchewan.  By interviewing the people who were involved in the process, the research was 
able to shed light on the operation of the TLEFA now that the interviewees are able to see how 
the process has functioned over time.  In that time bands have been able to start economic 
development for themselves by having secured assets in outstanding land claims settlements.  
MLCN was looked at as the example for this as they are often held up as the example of success 
by academics, business people, government officials, and members from other bands.  For this 
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reason, the band’s economic strategy selection was explored, and it has been found that they have 
used a blend of all four strategies that are recommended in the Harvard Project.  The First Nation 
still uses federal money, they have a development corporation established so the band owns the 
business initiatives, private band members’ access capital to start businesses, and joint ventures 
exist with non-band members.  MLCN also pays attention to elements recommended by both the 
Harvard Project and other academics, such as having a strong cultural match in their development 
systems, and having Action Oriented Leaders (i.e. Harry Lafond) involved in the process.  It is 
for this reason that MLCN and others have found MLCN’s economic developments to be 
successful.  This economic development started the road to breaking dependency from the 
Crown.   
The successes that have been occurring is likely to be what led to the ‘Made in 
Saskatchewan’ approach for First Nations governance discussions.  This area warrants further 
research.  However, this will only be truly achievable when more of the archival materials are 
made available for research.  This lack of information for a particular period time in 
Saskatchewan political history leaves gaps that later will need to be addressed.  As it stands, other 
jurisdictions, such as other provinces, can look to the Saskatchewan model for TLE settlements 
and can improve the process by taking into account elements that were needed in the 
Saskatchewan agreement but were missed.  As well, bands looking to implement economic 
development through TLE can look at what MLCN has done to make themselves a success, and 
can bring in the ideas and questions of other academics to ensure their economic plan fits well 
with their band’s objectives.  This, in all likelihood, will lead to more bands beginning their break 
of dependency from the Crown, creating self-determination for that band. 
As for the success that MLCN has experienced, it can be observed by exploring the 
band’s website.  The band is very detailed, as they include what they see as economic success for 
their community and provide a list of businesses they have helped facilitate within the 
community.  By using their blended strategy, MLCN has insulated their business from band 
politics by funnelling business from the corporation to the band members who develop personal 
enterprises.  This blended strategy is functioning because there was strong leadership that 
prepared the strategy, and because the strategy fit with the worldview of the band.  Through the 
exercise of their decision-making powers MLCN has aligned their economic development with 
the community’s needs and worldview, and as a result the band is breaking away from Crown 
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dependency.  
As I came to draw and finesse my conclusions, I was honoured to hear former Assembly 
of First Nations (AFN) Chief Ovide Mercredi speak in Northern Saskatchewan for a Treaty Six 
celebration.  In his talk, Mr. Mercredi showed the crowd a book commissioned by the 
Saskatchewan OTC, and explained that it was developed because there was a political will to do 
so.  He took questions after his talk and one of the questions was mine.  I asked if the same 
political will to settle outstanding land claims existed in other provinces.  Mercredi responded 
with a quick “no,” explaining that Saskatchewan is the leader in TLE in Canada and that it is a 
result of the political will being present.  The political will is present as illustrated by the fact that 
First Nations leaders were able to successfully advocate and develop a process.  The former 
Chief’s response solidified the idea that the TLEFA would only have happened with strong 
leaders working on the process and a strong political will.  This political will developed the 
TLEFA that was needed for bands to have access to resources to create economic development 
and break dependency.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Invitation for Participation in a Study 
 
February 10 2009 
 
Address 
Saskatoon, SK Postal Code 
Phone:  
Fax:  
 
Dear  
 
An invitation to participate in a study of: Self-Determination of First Nations Peoples in 
Saskatchewan: an investigation of Treaty Land Entitlement 
 
This is an invitation to participate in a study of Indigenous rights.  This study will analyze 
business models used in the management of Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) for First Nation 
peoples in Saskatchewan and will examine TLE as a vehicle for self-determination and 
sustainability. As First Nations reach settlements, there is an opportunity to learn from earlier 
settlements and decide on a governance model that is both successful and compatible with their 
own lifestyles and philosophies. 
 
I would like to interview you about your opinion and knowledge in the area of Treaty Land 
Entitlement and self-determination.  All materials recovered from these interviews will remain 
confidential, kept in secure storage for five years by the research supervisor, until the time of 
disposal where the materials will be destroyed beyond recognition.  An interview will take place 
after the consent form has been signed.  On the consent form is a list of the questions being 
asked, and the details of the study.  Once the transcription has been done, you will be asked to 
verify the material, if you wish, you may remain involved until the project is completed.  In the 
event that you choose to leave the project, you may do so at any time, and at which time, you 
would be debriefed, and all materials acquired from you the participant will be destroyed beyond 
repair.  
 
The interviews are one portion of the research involved for this project.  I would be happy to 
share the specifics of the project in detail, should you show interest in joining the study.  I ask 
that you consider this, as it may aid in future developments of bringing rights to Indigenous 
peoples in the world, or understanding political position at the very least.  If you agree to 
participate, I will need confirmation by February 20, 2009, as I would like to commence the 
interview process by March 10, 2009.  I appreciate your consideration. It is acknowledged that 
the U of S Beh-REB has reviewed this ethics proposal, and has approved the project. 
 
Sincerely, 
  
      Rebecca Major 
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 Contact Information 
  Rebecca Major 
  Phone: 306-261-7752 
Fax: 306-956-7752 
  Email: ram846@mail.uask.ca 
  Mailing address: 116 Avenue T North, Saskatoon, SK S7L 3A9 
 
Dr. Robert A. Innes 
Phone: 306-966-2197 
Email: rob.innes@usask.ca  
Mailing address: 137 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place, 
Saskatoon, SK S7N 5E6 
 
Dr. Brenda Macdougall 
Phone: 306-966-6642 
Email: b.macdougall@usask.ca   
Mailing address: 133 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place, Saskatoon, 
SK S7N 5E6 
 
U of S Beh-REB Research Ethics Office 
Phone: 306-966-2084 
Fax: 306-966-2069 
Room 306 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place,  
Saskatoon, SK S7N 5E6 
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Letter of Consent - Interview 
 
Self-Determination of First Nations Peoples in Saskatchewan: an investigation of Treaty Land 
Entitlement 
 
Rebecca Major, MA student at the University of Saskatchewan will conduct this study under the 
supervision of Robert Innes, PhD., Department of Native Studies at the University of 
Saskatchewan.  It is acknowledged that the U of S Beh-REB has reviewed this ethics proposal, 
and has approved the project. 
 
.  Contact Information 
  Rebecca Major 
  Phone: 306-261-7752 
Fax: 306-956-7752 
Email: ram846@mail.uask.ca 
  Mailing address: 116 Avenue T North, Saskatoon, SK S7L 3A9 
 
Dr. Robert A. Innes 
Phone: 306-966-2197 
Email: rob.innes@usask.ca  
Mailing address: 137 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place, 
Saskatoon, SK S7N 5E6 
 
Dr. Brenda Macdougall 
Phone: 306-966-6641 
Email: b.macdougall@usask.ca  
Mailing address: 133 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place, Saskatoon, 
SK S7N 5E6 
 
U of S Beh-REB Research Ethics Office 
Phone: 306-966-2084 
Fax: 306-966-2069 
Room 306 Kirk Hall, University of Saskatchewan, 117 Science Place,  
Saskatoon, SK S7N 5E6 
 
The purpose of this study is to improve upon the understanding of Treaty Land Entitlement in 
Saskatchewan and its implementation.  It is hoped that First Nations communities will be able to 
look to this document as a resource for potential ideas of TLE management and implementation.  
Please read the information below and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether 
to take part.  As your participation is voluntary, you can stop your participation at any time and 
your refusal will not influence current or future relationships.  Materials will be held for five 
years with the research supervisor, upon which time the materials will either be given to archives 
with consent of the participant, or be destroyed beyond recognition or recovery.  Should you 
decide to stop participation all materials contributed by you the participant, will be destroyed 
beyond recovery.  Simply tell the researcher, should you wish to stop participation.  The 
researcher will provide you with a copy of this consent for your records.  Once the interview has 
been completed, you, the participant, will be given a debriefing with a copy of the debriefing in 
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print.  Upon completion of the transcriptions from the interview, you will be given a copy of the 
transcripts for review.  This is to ensure validity and quality control.  You will be asked to review 
the materials for correctness.  At this time, you will still have the opportunity to opt out of the 
project.  As the participant, you have the right to ask for credit for the information they provide, 
for publication, and upon publication, you will be given a copy of the completed project.  It 
should also be mentioned that have the choice of not answering any questions they choose, and 
must tell the researcher when you feel uncomfortable. 
 
If you agree to this study, you will be asked the following questions: 
 
Interview Questions for Public Officials 
1.  Looking back, has Treaty Land Entitlement met your expectations? 
2.  What do you consider were the deficiencies in the process and the end result?  
3. What was envisioned when negotiating TLE? – Aspirations, disappointments? 
4.  What would you change if anything? 
5.  Did you anticipate the economic success First Nations have been experiencing as a result of 
TLE?  Did you expect more economic success by this point? 
6.  How has the economic development that has been created by TLE affected public perceptions 
towards First Nations peoples in the Province of Saskatchewan? 
 
The time for this should be adjusted accordingly.  You may review these questions and judge 
whether you have the time to participate in this project.  It also is an opportunity for you to decide 
if they feel comfortable answering the questions.  The time for the interview is expected to last 
one hour and should not exceed 2 hours, and the total interview period of the project is expected 
to last over the period of three months. 
  
There are no anticipated risks involved in this project.  You are able to review the questions 
ahead of time.  This demonstrates that there is no deception.  There is no intent of injury, and 
confidentiality will be kept.  
 
There will be no official compensation for this project in the way of rewards, as the research does 
not want the study to be compromised.  In the areas of tradition and traditional protocols, the 
necessary provisions will be made.  For example, when interviewing Indigenous elders, it is 
customary to give the gift of tobacco.   
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential.  There will be one copy 
kept with the researcher, while the other copy will be kept at the University of Saskatchewan, for 
a period of five years.  Authorized persons from The University of Saskatchewan have the legal 
right to review your research records and will protect the confidentiality of those records to the 
extent permitted by law.  As mentioned above, you will have a chance to be acknowledged in the 
work if you so choose.  Throughout the study, the researcher, Rebecca Major, will notify you of 
new information that may become available and that might affect your decision to remain in the 
study.  This is why there is a provision for you to leave the project at any time and is given many 
opportunities.  This study is politically sensitive, and the researcher wants to give you, the 
participants options.   
 
If there are any questions at any time, you may ask the researcher or the supervisor, through the 
 93 
contact methods above.  You may withdraw at any time.   
 
You, the participant, may respond via mail, secure fax, or email as provided by the researcher – 
Rebecca Major. 
 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your record 
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about 
participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Signature: __________________________________________Date: __________________ 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________Date: ___________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
 
 
 
Signature of Investigator: __________________________Date: __________________ 
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Interview Questions 
1.  Looking back, has Treaty Land Entitlement met your expectations? 
2.  What do you consider were the deficiencies in the process and the end result?  
3. What was envisioned when negotiating TLE? – Aspirations, disappointments? 
4.  What would you change if anything? 
5.  Did you anticipate the economic success First Nations have been experiencing as a result of 
TLE?  Did you expect more economic success by this point? 
6.  How has the economic development that has been created by TLE affected public perceptions 
towards First Nations peoples in the Province of Saskatchewan? 
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